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Abstract
ConcreteGoals, events, and actions can be mentally represented within a hierarchical framework that ranges from
more abstract to more concrete levels of identiﬁcation. A more abstract level of identiﬁcation involves
general, superordinate, and decontextualized mental representations that convey the meaning of goals,
events, and actions, “why” an action is performed, and its purpose, ends, and consequences. A more concrete
level of identiﬁcation involves speciﬁc and subordinate mental representations that include contextual
details of goals, events, and actions, and the speciﬁc “how” details of an action. This review considers three
lines of evidence for considering that dysregulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation may be a
transdiagnostic process. First, there is evidence that different levels of identiﬁcation have distinct functional
consequences and that in non-clinical samples level of goal/action identiﬁcation appears to be regulated in a
ﬂexible and adaptive way to match the level of goal/action identiﬁcation to circumstances. Second, there is
evidence that level of goal/action identiﬁcation causally inﬂuences symptoms and processes involved in
psychological disorders, including emotional response, repetitive thought, impulsivity, problem solving and
procrastination. Third, there is evidence that the level of goal/action identiﬁcation is biased and/or
dysregulated in certain psychological disorders, with a bias towards more abstract identiﬁcation for negative
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In anearly reviewof theutilityof a transdiagnostic or “acrossdisorder”
perspective,Harvey,Watkins,Mansell andShafran (2004) concluded that
there was evidence consistent with a number of deﬁnite transdiagnostic
cognitive and behavioral processes (e.g., selective attention, recurrent
thinking, and avoidance behaviour), which can be found across different
disorders. One reason to expect such processes to be common across
disorders is that these processes (e.g., selective attention) may reﬂect
normal psychological operations that are present in non-pathological
individuals but which become suborned to dysfunctional uses or
exaggerated as pathology develops. Building on this rationale, the current
review proposes that dysregulation in level of identiﬁcation for goals,
actions, events, and outcomes is a possible transdiagnostic process that
may be important across a range of disorders.
The hypothesis that goals, events, and actions can be mentally
represented within a hierarchical framework that ranges from more
abstract to more concrete levels of identiﬁcation is an important concept
withinanumberof social–cognitive theories (e.g., control theory, Carver&
Scheier, 1982, 1990; Powers, 1973a; construal level theory, Trope &
Liberman, 2003; action identiﬁcation theory, Vallacher &Wegner, 1987).
The conceptualization of abstract versus concrete that is common to all of
these theories is that a more abstract level of identiﬁcation involves
general, superordinate, and decontextualizedmental representations that
convey the essentialmeaning of goals, events, and actions that denote the
“why” aspects of an action including the ends that are consequential to it.
In contrast, a more concrete level of identiﬁcation involves subordinate,
contextual, and speciﬁc details of goal, events, and actions that denote the
feasibility,mechanics, andmeansof “how” todo the action. Control theory
approaches hypothesize that goals, events, and behaviors are hierarchi-
callyorganizedandcanbeprocessedatdifferent levelsof abstraction,with
more abstract, superordinate goals and standards guiding and informing
more concrete, subordinate goals and standards (Broadbent, 1977; Carver
& Scheier, 1982, 1990, 1998; Emmons, 1992; Powers, 1973a, b). Similarly,
within Action Identiﬁcation Theory (AIT; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), an
abstract identiﬁcation represents thepurpose andendsof an action (“why
it is carriedout”),whereas a concrete identiﬁcation represents the action's
process and means (“how it is carried out”). Thus, within AIT, the same
action (e.g., “locking my door”) can be identiﬁed in abstract terms (e.g.,
“maintaining security”, the purpose why the door is locked, i.e., a higher
level in thegoalhierarchy)or inmore concrete terms(e.g., “turningakey”,
the means how the action is implemented, i.e., a lower level in the goal
hierarchy). Abstract identiﬁcations of goals, events, and behaviors are
focusedon thedesirability and importanceof outcomes,whereas concrete
identiﬁcations are focused on the feasibility, mechanics, and planning of
outcomes. Importantly, clinically-relevant theories have proposed that
the level of abstractionused to represent goals, behaviors, and eventsmay
be an important dimension that inﬂuences psychopathology (e.g., the
reduced concreteness theory of worry, Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998; the
processing mode theory, Watkins, 2008; theories of escape from self,
Baumeister, 1990; Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991).
This paper develops these ideas concerning the role of the level of
abstraction used to represent goals, behaviors, and events (hencefor-
ward referred to as level of goal/action identiﬁcation1) in the onset and1 It is important to note that within a control theory account, goals, actions, and
outcomes are effectively synonymous since the reference values (and associated
perceptual input compared against the reference values) involve representations of
speciﬁc behaviors (“pick up the phone”), principles of behavior (“be friendly”) and
general concepts (sense of self and sense of relationship), whether performed by the
individual or by others (i.e., events) and their effects on the perceived environment
(i.e., outcomes). The use of the label “goal/action identiﬁcation” is used here to a)
acknowledge the impact of Action Identiﬁcation theory and its associated evidence to
the current analysis; b) make clear that levels of identiﬁcation apply to representations
of internally generated goals as well as actions (events) in the environment. Further,
as described later, it is important to note that “level of goal/action identiﬁcation” in the
current article is used as shorthand to refer to the prepotent operational level at which
goals, actions, events, and outcomes are currently and momentarily being represented.maintenance of psychopathology by developing a theoretical analysis
grounded within a control theory approach (Carver & Scheier, 1982;
Powers, 1973a; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Watkins, 2008), and then
examining the evidence relevant to this analysis. To anticipate the
main hypothesis, the current analysis proposes that dysregulation of
goal/action identiﬁcation, that is, an inability to ﬂexibly shift between
an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation, focused on higher-level
ends, and a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation, focused on
lower-level means, is a transdiagnostic process underpinning psy-
chopathology. This hypothesis is based on three lines of evidence.
First, different levels-of-goal/action identiﬁcation have distinct func-
tional effects on a range of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
outcomes that are symptoms of psychological disorders and/or
processes implicated in psychopathology (e.g., emotional reactivity,
Watkins, Moberly & Moulds, 2008; self-control, Fujita, Trope, Liber-
man & Levin-Sagi, 2006; repetitive thought, Watkins, 2008). Second,
the optimal level of goal/action identiﬁcation depends upon speciﬁc
circumstances, and level of goal/action identiﬁcation shifts adaptively
in response to context, including difﬁculty (Vallacher & Wegner,
1987) and mood state (Forgas, 2008), suggesting that level of goal/
action identiﬁcation is functionally regulated in non-disordered
individuals. Third, the predominant level of goal/action identiﬁcation
adopted in certain psychological disorders appears to be abnormal
relative to controls. Thus, there is evidence suggesting that level of
goal/action identiﬁcation can inﬂuence outcomes relevant to psycho-
logical disorders and that regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁ-
cation is a normal and adaptive process found in healthy individuals.
As such, it is a plausible hypothesis that disturbances in this process
might be found across a range of psychological disorders and
contribute to the onset and maintenance of those disorders. This
review will examine the theories and evidence relevant to the
regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation, including evidence
that it is regulated in response to change in circumstances, and review
its functional effects, before examining evidence that such regulation
of level of goal/action identiﬁcation may be impaired in different
psychological disorders, including evidence of asymmetric bias
towards abstract or concrete identiﬁcationwithin particular disorders.
2. The underpinning theories: control theory and action
identiﬁcation theory
The current analysis is theoretically based within control theory
and action identiﬁcation accounts, using the principles of these
theories to generate the hypotheses examined in the review. A brief
review of these theories, their key principles and predictions is
therefore necessary.
Control theory provides an integrative theoretical account of
human behavior, with particular reference to self-regulation, moti-
vation, and emotional experience (see Carver & Scheier, 1982;
Higginson, Mansell, & Wood, in press; Powers, 1973a). A key element
within control theory accounts is the negative feedback loop, which
functions to reduce perceived deviations from a reference value,
which corresponds to an individual's goal or purpose. The reference
value is compared against perceptual input, and any discrepancy (or
error) between the present state perceived and the reference value
generates a behavior directed towards the goal speciﬁed in the
reference value, with the function of reducing the discrepancy. The
behavior does not act to reduce the discrepancy directly but by having
an impact on the environment, which in turn changes the perceptual
input into the feedback loop. Thus, critically the function of the
negative feedback loop is not to generate behavior but rather to set up
and maintain conditions in which the perceptual input matches the
reference value, that is, to control its perception of the environment,
and, thereby minimise discrepancy.
A second key element within control theory accounts is that these
reference values or goals can be arranged in a hierarchy of means and
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the more abstract, superordinate goals, or ends. In control theory
accounts (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1990, 1998; Emmons, 1992;
Powers, 1973a,b), this hierarchical organization of goals is repre-
sented by a hierarchical organization of negative feedback loops.
Within this hierarchical organization, pursuit towards abstract goals
occurs by specifying reference values at the next lower level of
abstraction, all the way down to the concrete representations
required to specify the actual behaviors needed to progress towards
the goal. For example, one classiﬁcation of levels within control theory
approaches (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Powers, 1973a) proposes that the
reference values at the most abstract levels may represent a global
sense of idealized self (i.e., a decontextualized, superordinate
meaning capturing the essence of the self), which in turn sets the
broad principles that organize goals and behavioral standards across
multiple situations (e.g., to be an honest person), whereas the
reference values at the more concrete levels represent the speciﬁc
actions and behavioral programs and sequences necessary to
implement the principles in a particular situation (e.g., telling the
truth to a friend, i.e., more contextualized, speciﬁc details of how to do
the action). From this conceptualization, it can be seen that the
reference values and associated perceptual input within control
theory can include representations of both implications andmeanings
for the self, as well as speciﬁc behaviors, events, and outcomes.
Third, control theory accounts propose that a particular level in the
hierarchy may be functionally and operationally prepotent and
superordinate at any moment in time reﬂecting whether the
individual is focusing attention and awareness on a more abstract or
concrete level, and thereby representing reference values (goals) and
perceptual signals (from the environment) in a more abstract or
concrete manner (i.e., this corresponds to the current predominant
level of goal/action identiﬁcation; Carver & Scheier, 1982; Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987). It has been hypothesized that the “highest level of
control operating at any given moment corresponds to the level at
which the person is focally attentive at that moment” (Carver &
Scheier, 1982, p. 117), that is, whether the individual is focusing on a
more abstract or more concrete level of processing. Not every level of
control needs to be involved in all acts of self-regulation: People may
often function at the level of program control with little or no
reference to higher-order goals. Alternatively, self-regulation can
occur at a highly abstract level if the behavior is relatively familiar and
well-practised, because all subordinate levels would continue to
operate because their operation occurs in service of the functionally
superordinate level.
Fourth, control theory accounts hypothesize that effective self-
regulation (i.e., effective reduction of discrepancy) requires ﬂexible
and balanced coordination between the different levels within the
goal hierarchy, such that the superordinate level of control adaptively
varies in response to situational and task demands. There are two
elements to this effective coordination. Firstly, because pursuit
towards abstract goals occurs by specifying reference values at the
next lower level of abstraction, effective self-regulation requires that
abstract levels in the hierarchy are functionally connected and
engaged with concrete levels, with all interfacing with the present
environment. Breakdown of speciﬁcation from higher levels to lower
levels in the hierarchy, whether throughmismatch of reference values
or a lack of procedural detail with respect to behavioral programs and
sequences, will impair effective self-regulation (see Section 3.1 for
further detail). Secondly, the prepotent level of goal/action identiﬁ-
cation (i.e., where awareness is currently located in the hierarchy)
needs to be shifted to match the circumstances. Critically, depending
on context, a level of control that is too abstract, too concrete or that
fails to link abstract levels to concrete levels is hypothesized to be
detrimental (Carver & Scheier, 1998, chapter 13).
Thus, Action Identiﬁcation Theory (AIT: Vallacher &Wegner, 1987;
Vallacher, Wegner & Somoza, 1989) hypothesizes that there is anoptimal level of action identiﬁcation that varies with circumstances
such that performance is improved and negative emotional response
lessened when a personally easy action is identiﬁed in relatively
abstract terms (the action's purpose and meaning) or when a
personally difﬁcult, complex, or unfamiliar action is identiﬁed in
relatively concrete terms (the action's process and mechanical
details). AIT proposes that “when both a lower and a higher level of
identity are available, there is a tendency for the higher-level identity
to become prepotent” (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, p.5). In other
words, by default, individuals will tend to adopt a more abstract level
of identiﬁcation and be sensitive to the broader meanings and
implications of what they are doing. Consistent with this, there is
evidence that when a person has identiﬁed his or her current behavior
at a concrete level, there is greater readiness to accept a more abstract
identity made available by the context surrounding the action than if
the behavior was already identiﬁed at an abstract level, with the
emergence of this new identity promoting new courses of action
(Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986; Wegner, Vallacher,
Macomber, Wood & Arps, 1984). However, AIT also hypothesizes that
“when an action cannot be maintained in terms of its prepotent
identity, there is a tendency for a lower level identity to become
prepotent” (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, p.5). Thus, AIT proposes that
when faced with difﬁculties in performing an action, individuals shift
to more concrete levels of identiﬁcation in order to focus on how to
perform the action, thereby grounding them back in the realities of
the current environment. AIT thus proposes that the level of goal/
action identiﬁcation adopted is dynamically adjusted, oscillating from
more abstract to more concrete levels within the hierarchy in
response to circumstances, until eventually over repeated actions,
the individual converges on the level of identiﬁcation that enables
him or her to perform that particular behavior up to his or her
capacity. AIT predicts that an action will be identiﬁed at a more
abstract level to the extent that it is seen as easy to do, familiar, can
only be enacted in a limited number of ways, is short in duration, and
requires little time to learn well, such that well-practised actions will
tend to be represented more abstractly, consistent with the
circumstances when there is good integration down from abstract
levels to concrete levels.
Because the terms abstract and concrete are used multifariously
(and often vaguely) in psychology (and in lay speech), it is useful to
deﬁne exactly what is meant by abstract versus concrete identiﬁca-
tions in the current analysis. As the earlier paragraphs make clear, the
current analysis is grounded within control theory, and as such, the
current analysis operationalizes more abstract identiﬁcations as those
representing superordinate goals including the purpose, meanings,
and ends of a goal or action (“why it is carried out”), and more
concrete identiﬁcations as those representing subordinate goals
including the process and means of a goal or action (“how it is carried
out”). Level of goal/action identiﬁcation was chosen as the operatio-
nalization of abstraction in the current theoretical framework
because: (a) the current analysis is grounded within control theory
accounts and level of goal/action identiﬁcation is the primary feature
of abstract versus concrete processing within this theoretical
approach; (b) this is an element of abstraction for which there are
clear theoretical accounts of how it may inﬂuence psychopathology
and be responsive to context (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987; Watkins, 2008); c) means versus ends is the
operationalization of abstractness that is common to all the
theoretical perspectives considered; and d) there are advantages in
clarity, parsimony, and theoretical rigor in adopting a narrow and
speciﬁc operationalization of abstraction.
Moreover, it is important to be clear that the current analysis
concentrates on the level of identiﬁcation that is the functionally
superordinate and prepotent operational level at any moment, and
how this level of prepotent identiﬁcation can shift in response to
circumstances, with distinct consequences (with the phrase “level of
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identiﬁcation of goal, actions, and events that is currently functionally
prepotent in the hierarchy). Thus, the current analysis focuses on one
implication derived from control theory approaches concerning the
effect of shifting the current prepotent level of goal/action identiﬁ-
cation on psychopathology. Indeed, a full consideration of all
implications emerging from control theory for psychopathology is
beyond the scope of the current article (see Higginson et al., in press
for a discussion of some other implications). Nonetheless, it is
important to distinguish the currently prepotent level of goal/action
identiﬁcation and its functions from the ongoing representations
within each level of the hierarchy and their dynamic interactions. The
current analysis is focused on the ability to make momentary shifts in
the prepotent level of identiﬁcation in response to circumstances, and
the implications of such (in)ﬂexibility for psychopathology. This is
distinct from changes within the actual content of the representations
at each level of identiﬁcation, which is, of course, a natural
consequence of the operation of the feedback loops, both within
and across levels — as behavior causes changes in the environment
that signals movement towards or away from a reference value, the
reference values fed down to subordinate levels may change.
Moreover, as Carver and Scheier (1982, p.117) note “reference values
in the hierarchy are being matched (and new values being
substituted) more quickly at lower levels that at higher levels. That
is, many changes in muscle tensions are involved in making a single
turn; it takesmany turns to get to the friend's house; and it takesmore
than one act of responsibility to sustain one's self-esteem.” Thus,
changeswithin the content of concrete levels of identiﬁcation occur on
short-term scales and are more visible to observers, whereas changes
within the content of abstract levels of identiﬁcation take longer, are
less frequent and are less visible but have more enduring impact for
the individual because they inﬂuence the setting of all the subordinate
levels of the hierarchy. Moreover, studies examining AIT have
demonstrated that the content of both concrete and abstract
identiﬁcations can be responsive to environmental context resulting
in the integration of existing elements into new structureswithin that
level of identiﬁcation (Wegner et al., 1986, 1984). Such ongoing
changes within the representations of reference values at different
levels within the hierarchy in response to feedback are clearly an
important part of the process of self-regulation. For example,
Perceptual Control Theory (Powers, 1973a) proposes that psychopa-
thology is a consequence of conﬂicting goals, and that reorganization
of goal structure (resetting of sub-goals) through a trial-and-error
learning process is how this conﬂict and associated difﬁculties are
resolved. However, this is distinct from shifts between a prepotentTable 1
Conditions under which different levels of prepotent goal/action identiﬁcation are predicte
Level of goal/action i
Circumstances Abstract
Progress toward goal at rate equal or better than standard
(Neutral or Positive Affect)
Adaptive (consistency
Progress toward relatively abstract goal at rate lower than
standard (Negative Affect), with limited or irrelevant
speciﬁcation from abstract to concrete levels in goal
hierarchy (i.e., Difﬁcult, Complex, Unfamiliar), acting
in service of goals
Maladaptive (procra
increased emotional
Progress toward relatively abstract goal at rate lower than
standard (negative affect), acting to avoid awareness of
discrepancy
Maladaptive (as abov
Progress toward relatively concrete goal at rate lower than
standard, concrete goal currently unattainable
Adaptive (ﬂexibility,
alternative goal)
Conﬂict between levels in hierarchy, especially when
lower-level appetitive
Adaptive (self-control
Conﬂict resulting from incompatible sub-goals to same
higher-order goal
Adaptive (ﬂexibility,concrete level of identiﬁcation to a prepotent abstract level of
identiﬁcation (or vice versa), which is the focus of the current
analysis (although as discussed in Section 3.1, shifts in the prepotent
level of identiﬁcation may inﬂuence the process of changes within
reference values).
3. Flexible regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation
3.1. Functional effects of different levels of goal/action identiﬁcation
The control theory accounts hypothesize that level of goal/action
identiﬁcation shifts in response to circumstances in a functional way,
and, thus, as a corollary, dysregulation of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation may be problematic. Both AIT and control theory
propose that the level of goal/action identiﬁcation adopted is adaptive
when it matches the function required of the task in hand. Within
these theories, the potential advantages and disadvantages of an
abstract versus concrete level of identiﬁcation centre around their
relative sensitivity to contextual and situational detail. Relative to a
concrete level of identiﬁcation, an abstract identiﬁcation insulates an
individual from the speciﬁc context, making the individual less
distractible, less impulsive, and enabling more consistency and
stability of goal pursuit across time, but also making the individual
less responsive to the environment and to any situational change, and
providing fewer speciﬁc guides to action and problem solving because
of their distance from the mechanics of action (see Table 1 for
summary of conditions under which different levels of goal/action
identiﬁcation have distinct consequences).
Thus, adopting an abstract level of identiﬁcation is hypothesized to
have the following advantages: (a) it increases consistency and
stability of behavior towards long-term goals across time and across
different situational demands, because it ensures that subordinate
goals and actions remain directed towards personally important goals
and minimizes interference from incidental inﬂuences (Carver &
Scheier, 1998; Fujita et al., 2006; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 1989);
(b) it provides more ﬂexibility in responding to relatively concrete
goals that are unattained, because an abstract level of identiﬁcation
affords more alternative sub-goals and behaviors to resolve the goal
discrepancy (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996, e.g., for poor progress on
the goal of writing a poem, identifying the goal abstractly as “to be
creative” provides alternative routes to the goal such as playing
music); (c) it facilitates the resolution of chronic goal conﬂict, in
which there are two incompatible sub-goals (e.g., “always tell the
truth”, “don't upset other people”), generated from the same higher-
order goal (e.g., be a considerate person), which is hypothesized to bed to be adaptive versus maladaptive.
dentiﬁcation
Concrete
and stability of behavior) Neutral to maladaptive (distractible by environment)
stination, rumination,
impact)
Adaptive (problem solving, less emotional impact,
initiates action)
e) Maladaptive (immersion, distraction in
immediate sensation)
substitution with Maladaptive (if unable to pursue concrete goal)
, delayed gratiﬁcation) Maladaptive (impulsivity, craving and
immediate gratiﬁcation)
reprioritization) Maladaptive (repetition of concrete routine)
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more abstract level of identiﬁcation can resolve such goal conﬂict
either by affording alternative subordinate sub-goals to serve the
abstract goal that are not in conﬂict (i.e., ﬂexibility as above) or by
adjusting the importance of the sub-goals (i.e., ends and conse-
quences) so as to prioritize one over the other. Thus, in the main,
adopting a more abstract level of identiﬁcation (i.e., having a higher
level in the goal hierarchy as the prepotent operational level) will be
advantageous.
However, there are circumstances when a concrete level of
identiﬁcation is hypothesized to be adaptive and an abstract level of
identiﬁcation maladaptive. First, because pursuit towards abstract
goals occurs by specifying reference values at the next lower level,
down to the actual concrete behaviors required, an abstract level of
identiﬁcation will only be advantageous when there is extensive and
relevant procedural knowledge specifying the links between the
abstract purpose and the concrete means necessary to achieve it, such
as when an activity is well-practised or straightforward. Under
circumstances of complexity, unfamiliarity, difﬁculty, or stress, this
speciﬁcation of reference values down through the control hierarchy
breaks down, and the advantages of abstract construal are lost. Thus,
as proposed by Carver and Scheier (1982, p.125) “it is likely that a
good deal of the behavioral disruption that is viewed as neurotic or
maladaptive stems from an inability to specify reference values from
the level of system concepts (or principles) down to and through the
level of program control.” For example, adopting an abstract level of
identiﬁcation as prepotent would not be useful for a learner driver still
getting used to handling a car or for an experienced driver in
hazardous, unfamiliar driving conditions such as a snowstorm, since
in both cases there is not well-established speciﬁcation of how
abstract reference values translate into sub-goals and concrete
behavior. Instead, in these circumstances, self-regulation needs to
be guided by a more concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation that
serve the function of determining the speciﬁc means and actions
(how) by which to best proceed and focusing close attention on the
immediate environment. A similar point is made by Powers (1973a)
when he notes that higher-level control systems can be functionally
dissociated from lower level system, to operate within the ‘imagina-
tion mode’, in which mode the higher-level control systems can
become disengaged from the present moment, with the potential for
maladaptive consequences.
Within control theory terms, the circumstances considered
difﬁcult can be operationalized as when progress towards a goal
occurs at a rate lower than the standard (or is expected to occur at a
rate lower than desired), as detected by a “meta-monitoring system”,
which is a further negative feedback loop checking on how well a
control feedback loop is reducing the discrepancy between its
particular reference value and perceptual input (Carver & Scheier,
1990). Importantly, when the rate of progress at reducing the
discrepancy in the action loop is slower than the meta-monitoring
system's reference value, doubt and negative affect result.2 Thus, a
concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation may be expected to be
more adaptive when there is a slower rate of progress than expected
on personally relevant goals, which may be signalled by negative
affect and/or negative cognition. Within this analysis, insufﬁcient rate
of goal progress (difﬁculty) can be further operationalized as resulting
from: a) a lack of speciﬁcation from abstract levels to concrete levels
(i.e., an unfamiliar situation or a complex task that is not yet well-
practised); b) incorrect speciﬁcation of reference values down the
hierarchy (i.e., a mismatch where the reference value at a concrete2 Carver and Scheier (1990) argue that the same meta-monitoring mechanism is
engaged during attempts to analyze or imagine the likelihood of different possible
outcomes — such that playing through a scenario that is negative (such as when told
that a task will be difﬁcult, cf Vallacher et al., 1987) will indicate a further reduction in
progress and the meta loop will yield greater doubt and negative affect.level is irrelevant or unhelpful for the higher-level goal for the higher-
level goal; c) disturbances and obstacles that impede or disrupt
progress even when the procedural knowledge between abstract and
concrete levels is well established, resulting from the environment
(e.g., unusual conditions, sudden changes in situation, an unexpected
response) or internal state (e.g., tiredness, mood, anxiety); and
d) setting too high a reference standard for progress.
Second, when the superordinate abstract goal is ill-deﬁned and it is
difﬁcult to specify how it might actually be achieved, adopting an
abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation as prepotent is going to be
problematic, since the subordinate levels will continue to operate in
the service of whatever level is functionally superordinate but in the
absence of a useful reference value (e.g., a goal like “be happy” is too
vague to provide clear guidance as to how an individual might specify
sub-goals towards attaining it). In contrast, adopting a concrete level
of identiﬁcation may help with goal progress by breaking the task
down into more speciﬁc, proximal sub-goals and associated behav-
ioral steps, and thereby, provide immediate direction to one's
behavior and more discrete and salient markers of progress (Emmons,
1992), leading to improved self-efﬁcacy, improved motivation, and
improved task performance (Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Stock& Cervone,
1990). It is easier to determine if one is being successful at pursuing a
lower-level goal like “keeping your desk clean” than the associated
higher-level goal of “being more organized”.
Third, processing at a more abstract level may interfere with goal
disengagement: the more abstract the level at which a goal is
represented in the hierarchy, the more important the goal becomes to
the general sense of self, and the harder it becomes to disengage from
the goal (Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996). When a goal is difﬁcult or
impossible to attain, processing at too abstract a level will make it
harder to relinquish the goal, trapping the individual in the invidious
state where he or she can neither make progress toward the goal nor
abandon it, leading to ongoing negative affect and depression
(Hamilton, Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Cather, 1993; Pyszczynski &
Greenberg, 1987) and persistent unconstructive repetitive thought
(Watkins, 2008).
Fourth, the level of goal/action identiﬁcation may inﬂuence the
emotional response to a rate of progress on a goal lower than the
standard. Carver and Scheier (1990, p. 23) noted that “it seems that
discrepancies noted by the meta system have greater emotional
impact when they concern a central element of the self than when
they bear only on a more peripheral goal (a program or a sequence of
action). Sometimes a task failure has a big impact on one's feelings,
sometimes not. The difference between these cases would seem to be
the level of abstraction at which the person is focusing.” Thus,
processing a negative outcome (poor goal progress) at a more abstract
level of goal/action identiﬁcation may intensify its negative emotional
impact.
Carver and Scheier (1998) further proposed that the effects of
adopting a more concrete level of identiﬁcation will depend on
whether the concrete level of identiﬁcation is linked to making
progress on an abstract goal higher in the hierarchy or is instead a
means of disengaging attention from an abstract reference value. If a
concrete identiﬁcation focuses on the concrete means necessary to
deliver a higher-level abstract goal, it will be adaptive in achieving the
goal. However, if the concrete identiﬁcation serves to protect the
person from an awareness of more abstract consequences and
implications, particularly concerning the self, it is less likely to
facilitate goal progress.
This argument is functionally equivalent to the theory of “escape
from self” (Baumeister, 1990; Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991), used
to explain impulsive responses in eating disorders, alcohol use, and
suicide, in which exclusive focus on concrete details and sensory
experience, such as in a binge, can be a means to avoid any higher-
level thought, such as abstract evaluations of the self. The theory of
“escape from self” is explicit that dysregulation in level of goal/action
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attempt or a binge. The escape theory argues that an aversive state of
high self-awareness occurs from making internal attributions and
unfavourable comparisons concerning discrepancies between desired
state and current state, leading to negative evaluations and implica-
tions about the self (i.e., abstract level of goal identiﬁcation involving
abstract reference values and abstract perceptual signals), which
leads to increased negative affect. In response to this negative affect
and awareness of negative self-related implications, the individual
attempts to escape from these negative evaluations by adopting
concrete processing focused on immediate sensory experience. This
concrete level of identiﬁcation reduces inhibitions and impulsiveness,
leading to an increased likelihood of attempting suicide, binging,
drinking, drug use, or other impulsive behavior.
3.2. Adaptive regulation of level of goal and action identiﬁcation
Thus, control theory and AIT generate the hypothesis that a
concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation is typically adaptive under
circumstances of complexity, unfamiliarity, difﬁculty, or stress (i.e.,
when there is not a well-developed connection from higher-level
goals to lower-level goals or when prior speciﬁcations of reference
values down the goal hierarchy is no longer appropriate because of
changing circumstances), because it facilitates detailed guidance as to
what to do next, whereas under circumstances that are safe, familiar,
and straightforward (i.e., where there is a well-developed speciﬁca-
tion of reference values including a range of alternative sub-goals
readily available) or require focus on long-term goals, abstract
construal is hypothesized to be adaptive, as it enables stability and
ﬂexibility in goal pursuit (see Table 1). Moreover, since control theory
accounts hypothesize that mood is a function of relative goal progress,
with negative versus positive affect resulting from less versus greater
progress towards a goal than desired and expected (Carver & Scheier,
1990), it is hypothesized that negative affect would be associatedwith
a shift to a more concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation. Similar
predictions have been made by theories that propose that affect
inﬂuences the process of cognition (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler,
2001; Forgas, 2008). These theories propose that positive affect
promotes an abstract, global processing style, whereas negative affect
promotes a concrete, local, processing style that focuses on the
demands of the external world, paying careful attention to external
stimulus information. Like AIT and control theory, this effect of mood
on level of goal/action identiﬁcation is hypothesized to be adaptive in
that it matches the level of cognitive processing to situational need
(Bless et al., 1996; Beukeboom & Semin, 2005; Forgas, 2008). If a
negative mood signals a problematic situation, then a shift to a
concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation would be adaptive because
it provides more contextual detail about the speciﬁc means and
alternatives by which to proceed, whereas abstract processing is more
functional in safe, familiar situations, characterized by positive affect.
There is considerable evidence consistent with the hypotheses
that: (a) different levels of goal/action identiﬁcations have distinct
functional effects, with abstract identiﬁcations aiding long-term goal
pursuit, and concrete identiﬁcations more adaptive in difﬁcult
circumstances; (b) level of goal/action identiﬁcation shifts adaptively
to circumstances. First, individuals tend by default to use a more
abstract level of identiﬁcation (Wegner & Vallacher, 1987; Wegner
et al., 1986, 1984), yet when faced with difﬁcult, novel or complex
situations, people often move towards more concrete identiﬁcations
(Vallacher, Wegner & Frederick, 1987; Wegner et al., 1984). For
example, when given an unwieldy cup that made drinking more
difﬁcult, participants tended to provide more concrete descriptions of
the act of drinking than individuals given normal cups (Wegner et al.,
1984). Second, when giving a speech, focusing on the concrete process
of giving the speech resulted in less anxiety and less performance
dissatisfaction when the task was perceived to be difﬁcult, whereasfocusing on the abstract purpose of the speech resulted in less anxiety
and less performance dissatisfaction when the task was perceived to
be easy (Vallacher et al., 1989; Vallacher, Wegner, McMahan, Cotter &
Larsen, 1992). Third, a concrete level of identiﬁcation can facilitate
effective behavioral self-regulation by improving problem solving
(Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a), and by
focusing attention on the immediate demands of the present
situation, and freeing up cognitive resources (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1999;
Webb & Sheeran, 2003). Fourth, a habitual tendency towards more
abstract level of identiﬁcation is associated with more persistent and
stable behavior, greater self-motivation, less impulsiveness, and fewer
action errors (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Fifth, inducing an abstract
level of identiﬁcation produces greater self-control on experimental
tasks than inducing a concrete level of identiﬁcation (Fujita et al.,
2006).
Moreover, there is extensive evidence supporting the hypothesis
that level of goal/action identiﬁcation shifts with mood. Happy mood
is associated with more global and abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation, whereas sad mood is associated with a more local,
concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation that is more attentive to
detailed, external information (e.g., Beukeboom & Semin, 2005, 2006;
Bless et al., 1996; Forgas, 2007; Forgas & East, 2008; Gasper & Clore,
2002; Storbeck & Clore, 2005). For example, Beukeboom and Semin
(2005) used the Behavioral Identiﬁcation Form (BIF), which presents
participants with a list of behaviors (e.g., “eating”), and asks them to
endorse one of two subsequent descriptions differing in their level of
action identiﬁcation (e.g., “getting nutrition” [abstract], versus
“chewing and swallowing” [concrete]). Participants in a happy
mood endorsed descriptions of actions that were more abstract than
participant in a sad mood.
Thus, there is evidence in non-clinical research samples that level
of goal/action identiﬁcation is ﬂexibly regulated in response to
circumstances, and, in particular, in response to mood state.
Consistent with control theory and AIT, non-clinical participants
adopt the level of goal/action identiﬁcation hypothesized to be most
adaptive to the current circumstances. Furthermore, there is evidence
consistent with the hypotheses that different levels of goal/action
identiﬁcation have distinct functional effects. Taken together, the
extant evidence suggests that level of goal/action identiﬁcation is
adaptively regulated to circumstances in healthy controls. Given the
adaptive regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation typically seen
in healthy controls, it is a plausible hypothesis that psychological
disorders may involve impaired regulation of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation.4. Level of goal/action identiﬁcation is causally implicated in
symptoms and psychopathology
Moreover, any evidence that manipulating level of goal/action
identiﬁcation inﬂuences clinically-relevant outcomes, such as symp-
toms and processes involved in psychological disorders, would
suggest that impaired regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation
may potentially be involved in the onset and maintenance of
psychopathology. This section summarizes evidence that level of
goal/action identiﬁcation causally inﬂuences a range of symptoms and
processes involved in psychological disorders. This is also further
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that different levels of goal/
action identiﬁcations have distinct functional effects. A conservative
criterion for inclusion was adopted with reference to evidence
reviewed: for inclusion in the current paper, each study needed to
a) involve a manipulation or measure of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation; b) involve a dependent variable that was relevant to
well-validated symptoms and processes involved in psychological
disorders, such as emotional response, repetitive thought, and self-
control.
3 The ﬁndings for the current operationalization of abstract versus concrete
processing in terms of level of goal/action identiﬁcation are consistent with the other
features used in the broader deﬁnition in construal level theory — all of these
conceptualizations of abstraction are consistently shown to increase with psycholo-
gical distance. Because the current analysis focuses on predictions emerging from
control theory, with its emphasis on goal hierarchy and means versus ends, a focus on
other deﬁnitions of abstraction is less relevant and beyond the scope of the current
article. The key point is that psychological distance inﬂuences level of goal/action
identiﬁcation.
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the paper will brieﬂy consider one further relevant literature, which
suggests that level of goal/action identiﬁcation is functionally
associated with psychological distance and visual perspective,
because these ﬁndings indicate that evidence concerning psycholog-
ical distance and visual perspective may also be relevant to this
review.
4.1. Level of goal/action identiﬁcation and psychological distance
In addition to its primary derivation from control theory accounts,
this analysis also draws on recent research conducted within the
framework of Construal Level Theory (CLT; see reviews in Trope &
Liberman, 2003; Trope, Liberman & Wakslak, 2007), which examines
the effects of psychological distance on the construal of events and
behaviors. CLT argues that there is a strong functional connection
between psychological distance and the abstractness of representa-
tions of behaviors, events, and objects. Psychological distance is
deﬁned as the distance of an object or event in space, time, social
distance, or likelihood from the directly experienced self in the here-
and-now. CLT proposes that the greater the perceived psychological
distance, the more likely an object or event will be construed in an
abstract way (and vice versa). Thus, experiencing sensory details in
the present moment would be psychologically close (and correspond-
ingly afford concrete construal), whereas imagining an unlikely event
occurring to another in several years would be psychologically distant
(and afford more abstract construal).
This relationship between psychological distance and level of
construal is proposed to emerge from individuals learning implicitly
over time that distance typically reduces the availability of informa-
tion necessary for concrete construal, whilst retaining information
relevant for abstract information, such that it is more adaptive to
construe distal events more abstractly. For example, “my birthday
tomorrow” has considerable contextual detail concerning the likely
environment and people present, whilst “my birthday in 10 years”
lacks such contextual detail. As such, it would be more functional to
adopt abstract construals for distant events (parallel arguments apply
for objects and events at greater spatial distance or less likelihood).
CLT argues that this tendency to construe more distal events and
objects more abstractly is overlearnt and becomes a generalized
heuristic, such that distance and level of construal are automatically
associated, each bidirectionally causing the other. Consistent with this
hypothesis, there is evidence that manipulating psychological
distance causally inﬂuences the level of abstraction at which
behaviors and events are represented, and vice versa, demonstrating
the functional connection and equivalence between distance and level
of abstraction (see Trope et al., 2007 for review). For the purposes of
the current analysis, although construal level theory has a broad
deﬁnition of abstraction that incorporates multiple dimensions, some
of which may be unrelated (see Fujita et al., 2006, including means
versus ends, primary versus secondary features, pro versus cons,
alignable versus non-alignable features, pictorial versus linguistic),
“consistent with action identiﬁcation theory (Vallacher & Wegner,
1987), the representation of action in terms of means–ends relation-
ships is viewed as an important dimension of level of construal of
instrumental actions” (Fujita et al., 2006, p. 352). Moreover, within
control theory, as noted earlier, different levels of identiﬁcation can
also be applied to objects, events, and outcomes, as a function of the
generation of reference values and perceptual signals at different
levels within the hierarchy. Importantly, the data generated within
the study of construal level theory has directly shown that
psychological distance can inﬂuence the prepotent level of goal/
action identiﬁcation adopted. For example, actions were construed in
abstract why terms rather than concrete how terms when they
pertained to the more distant future (Liberman and Trope, 1998), to
greater spatial distance (Fujita et al., 2006), and to lower probabilityevents (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006). Moreover, the
reverse relationship has been shown, with abstract why levels of
action identiﬁcation leading to estimates that the action would occur
more distantly in time and space and be less likely to occur than
concrete how levels of action identiﬁcation (Liberman, Trope, Macrae,
& Sherman, 2007; Wakslak & Trope, 2009), demonstrating the
functional connection and equivalence between distance and level-
of-identiﬁcation.3
This link with psychological distance suggests that the most
concrete level of identiﬁcation will tend to be focused on direct and
immediate experience in the present moment (e.g., when driving to a
friends to return study notes, a highly concrete level of identiﬁcation
would focus on the sensation of gripping the steering wheel). In
contrast, a more abstract level of identiﬁcation will tend to be more
focused on underlying ends, meanings, and consequences with
reference to principles (e.g., “follow through on commitments”,
which is relatively decontextualized as it can be applied in different
ways at different times and places) or to system concepts (e.g., “to be
responsible”, which necessarily applies across a time frame extended
beyond the present moment). As such, a more concrete level of goal/
action identiﬁcation will tend to bemore present-focused than amore
abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation. Of course, as noted earlier,
when there is extensive procedural knowledge specifying the links
between the abstract purpose and the concrete means necessary to
achieve it, such as when an activity is well-practised or straightfor-
ward, even abstract levels in the hierarchy will be present-focused
through their engagement with the lower level control systems that
interface with the present environment. For example, Carver and
Scheier (1990, p. 21) provide the example of an individual “who is
presently attempting to conform to his ideal self-image, by using the
principle of kindness to guide his actions, a principle that presently is
being manifest through the program of shovelling snow from a
neighbor's sidewalk”, a program that guides the reference values for
sequences such as “lifting the shovel”, which in turn informs the
reference values for the sensations of gripping, etc. Thus, within the
current analysis, the adoption of a prepotent operational level of goal/
action identiﬁcation that is abstract will tend to be associated with
distance from present-focused, here-and-now direct experience, but
only in the context of a dissociation between higher levels and lower
levels in the control hierarchy, that is, in unfamiliar, complex, difﬁcult
or stressful situations, where there is not well-developed procedural
knowledge linking abstract ends to concrete means. Thus, level of
goal/action identiﬁcation is related to the degree of direct contact with
experience (concrete) versus separation and distance from direct
experience (abstract), under the unfamiliar and stressful circumstances
that are highly relevant to psychopathology. Contact with experience is
increasingly viewed as clinically important: (a) experiential avoidance,
deﬁned as attempts to avoid internal experiences (e.g., thoughts and
feelings) is implicated in themaintenanceof a rangeof disorders (Hayes,
Wilson, Gifford, Follette & Strosahl, 1996); (b) treatments that
emphasise immediate here-and-now experiencing have beneﬁcial
effects on psychopathology (e.g., mindfulness-based CBT, Teasdale
et al., 2000; Kuyken et al., 2008).
Related to the concept of psychological distance, Libby, Shaeffer
and Eibach (2009) demonstrated that level of goal/action identiﬁca-
tion is also functionally connected with visual perspective (or vantage
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person perspective, “seeing oneself in a scene”) is functionally
equivalent to an abstract why level of identiﬁcation, whereas a ﬁeld
perspective (ﬁrst person perspective, “seeing through one's own
eyes”) is functionally equivalent to a concrete how level of goal/action
identiﬁcation. Experimentally manipulating visual perspective (ﬁeld
versus observer) inﬂuenced the level of goal/action identiﬁcation
used to describe an imagined or perceived object, and vice versa,
indicating a bidirectional causal relationship between visual perspec-
tive and level of goal/action identiﬁcation. This is further evidence
that level of goal/action identiﬁcation may be associated with
psychological disorder, since visual perspective of personal memories
and images is implicated in psychopathology (e.g., Kuyken & Moulds,
2009; Spurr & Stopa, 2003).
4.2. Emotional response
Disturbed affect, such as increased depressed mood, increased
anxiety, or reduced experience of pleasure (anhedonia), is a key
symptom in mood and anxiety disorders. Thus, evidence that level of
goal/action identiﬁcation can inﬂuence emotional response to situa-
tions would suggest that (dys) regulation of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation could potentially be involved in these disorders. There is
evidence that level of goal/action identiﬁcation inﬂuences the
emotional response to stressful and negative situations. First,
experimentally manipulating level of goal/action identiﬁcation inﬂu-
ences emotional response to a subsequent anagram stress failure task
(Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins et al., 2008). Level of goal/action
identiﬁcation was manipulated by asking participants to imagine
emotional scenarios, with instructions inducing either concrete
(“Focus on how this event happened, and imagine in your mind as
vividly and concretely as possible a ‘movie’ of how this event
unfolded”) or abstract identiﬁcations (“Think about why this event
happened, and analyze the causes, meanings and implications of this
event”). Moberly and Watkins (2006) found that high ruminators
trained to adopt an abstract level of processing showed greater
reduction in positive affect following the failure than high ruminators
trained to adopt a concrete level of processing or low ruminators in
either condition. Watkins et al. (2008) found that participants trained
to adopt a concrete level of processing demonstrated smaller
reductions in positive affect and smaller increases in negative affect
to the subsequent failure than participants trained to adopt an
abstract level of processing.
Second, Watkins (2004) randomly allocated participants to
expressive writing about a previously induced failure in either an
abstract way (e.g., “Why did you feel this way?”) or a concrete way
(e.g., “How did you feel moment-by-moment?”). Level of goal/action
identiﬁcation inﬂuenced emotional recovery from the failure: At
higher levels of trait rumination, levels of negative mood 12 h after
the failure were greater, but only in individuals who wrote abstractly
and not in individuals who wrote concretely. Third, Houser-Marko
and Sheldon (2008) examined the effect of framing failure or success
feedback on a verbal skills task either abstractly (higher-order ends)
or concretely (means to achieve those ends). Participants who framed
failure abstractly reported signiﬁcantly greater negative affect,
signiﬁcantly lower positive affect, and signiﬁcantly less positive
expectancy for future performance than participants who framed
failure concretely or participants who received success feedback. In a
follow-up naturalistic study, when progress on a personal goal was
absent, participants allocated to process progress at an abstract level
experienced greater decreases in mood and expectancy than
participants who construed progress concretely.
Fourth, voluntarily recalling an emotional event in speciﬁc detail
produces less emotional response than recalling it at a more general
level (Neumann & Philippot, 2007; Philippot, Baeyens & Douilliez,
2006; Philippot, Schaefer & Herbette, 2003) and practice at recallingspeciﬁc, contextualized autobiographical memories reduces the
negative experience to a subsequent stressful task relative to practice
at recalling general, decontextualized memories (Raes, Hermans,
Williams & Eelen, 2006). Fifth, the effect of visual perspective adopted
when recalling an experimentally induced experience of exclusion
was found to causally inﬂuence the negative effects of ostracism, with
negative effects only persisting for participants allocated to an
observer perspective (Lau, Moulds & Richardson, 2009). The ﬁeld
perspective, functionally connected with a concrete level of goal/
action identiﬁcation (Libby et al., 2009), resulted in faster recovery
from a negative event.
There is less evidence concerning the effects of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation on response to positive events. People with low self-
esteem (LSE) have a tendency to think concretely about recent
compliments, whereas people with high self-esteem tend to think
abstractly about recent compliments, focusing on their general
meanings and implications (Marigold, Holmes & Ross, 2007).
Moreover, when people with LSE are induced to think abstractly
about a recent compliment from a romantic partner, they report
greater state self-esteem and greater security in their relationship
than LSE people induced to think concretely about a recent
compliment. Thus, there is preliminary evidence that being abstract
may enhance the emotional effects of positive events, and that this
tendency is reduced in LSE people, who are more vulnerable to mood/
anxiety disorders.
In summary, there is consistent evidence that when faced with
failure or stress, adopting a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation
results in less increase in negative affect and/or less reduction in
positive affect than adopting an abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation. This is further evidence consistent with control theory
and AIT hypotheses that it may be adaptive to shift to a concrete level
of identiﬁcation when faced with difﬁculties or stress, and suggests
that the tendency to become more concrete to negative outcomes
may be functional. Moreover, these ﬁndings suggest that level of goal/
action identiﬁcation causally inﬂuences emotional response, indicat-
ing that level of goal/action identiﬁcation could potentially contribute
to disturbed affect in mood and anxiety disorders. These studies did
not use clinical samples, so we do not know whether these effects
would generalize to patient groups. However, a clinical intervention
focused on training individuals to adopt more a more concrete
processing style in response to difﬁculties reduced symptoms of
depression, relative to a no-training control, in dysphoric individuals,
of whom 50% met criteria for a current episode of major depression
(Watkins, Baeyens & Read, 2009).4.3. Repetitive thought
Repetitive thought (RT) focused on negative content, such as
depressive rumination and worry, is a common concomitant of mood
and anxiety disorders, and has been implicated as an important
process in the onset and maintenance of both depression and anxiety
(for full review see Watkins, 2008). Moreover, RT about negative
content has been identiﬁed as a deﬁnite transdiagnostic process
(Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Harvey et al., 2004; Watkins, 2009a).
Prospective longitudinal studies have found that depressive rumina-
tion predicts the onset and maintenance of episodes of major
depression, as well as symptoms of depression (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema,
2000; Spasojević & Alloy, 2001). Similarly, chronic worry is a central
and deﬁning characteristic of Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and post-
event rumination is a typical process in social anxiety. Rumination
about trauma predicts the persistence of post-traumatic stress
disorder in prospective longitudinal studies from 6 months to
3 years later (e.g., Ehlers, Mayou & Bryant, 1998, 2003). Thus, RT is
an important pathological process across psychological disorders. As
such, any data implicating level of goal/action identiﬁcation in
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identiﬁcation may have transdiagnostic effects.
Critically, a recent integrative review (Watkins, 2008) concluded
that RT with negative consequences, such as found in mood and
anxiety disorders, is characterized by (a) a focus on negative content
(e.g., problems and symptoms) coupled with (b) a processing style
characterized by an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation focused
on meanings and implications, and asking “why?”. This conclusion
was based on evidence that: (i) unhelpful RT is characterized by an
abstract level of processing and (ii) manipulating level of goal/action
identiﬁcation inﬂuenced the consequences of RT (see Watkins, 2008).
As an example of (i), depressive rumination is characterized by an
abstract level of identiﬁcation since it is focused on meanings,
consequences, implications, and “why” questions, and involves
reduced concreteness of thinking (Watkins & Moulds, 2005a, 2007).
As an example of (ii), in depressed patients, compared to abstract
rumination focused on meanings and implications, concrete rumina-
tion focused on direct experience reduced negative global self-
judgments (Rimes &Watkins, 2005), improved social problem solving
(Watkins & Moulds, 2005a), and increased speciﬁcity of autobio-
graphical memory recall (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). Since
these processes are implicated in the onset and maintenance of
depression, these ﬁndings suggest that concrete rumination reduces
cognitive processing implicated in increased vulnerability for depres-
sion, relative to abstract rumination.
Similarly, in an analogue study of post-traumatic stress symptoms,
undergraduates watched a distressing ﬁlm showing the aftermath of
motor vehicle accidents, known to induce negative affect and
intrusions, and were then randomly allocated to abstract rumination,
concrete rumination, or distraction (Ehring, Szeimies & Schaffrick,
2009). Across time, abstract rumination resulted in slower recovery of
negative affect than concrete rumination or distraction. Moreover,
concrete rumination resulted in fewer negative intrusions than
abstract rumination and distraction, which did not differ from each
other. Thus, these results suggest that abstract rumination may be
particularly unconstructive following exposure to a distressing event.
Thus, there is evidence that level of goal/action identiﬁcation
inﬂuences whether RT has constructive or unconstructive conse-
quences and whether it becomes pathological. Since negative RT is an
important psychopathological process judged to be transdiagnostic,
this suggests that level of goal/action identiﬁcation and its regulation
may be important across a range of psychological disorders.
4.4. Personal problem solving and planning
Difﬁculties in problem solving and poor planning are characteristic
of many psychological disorders. Both the reduced concreteness
theory (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002) and the AIT (Vallacher & Wegner,
1987) hypothesize that a more concrete level of goal/action
identiﬁcation provides more elaborated and contextual detail about
the speciﬁc means, alternatives, and actions by which to best proceed
when faced with difﬁcult, novel or complex situations. Similarly,
Leary, Adams and Tate (2006) argued that abstract construal about
the evaluative or interpersonal implications of one's behavior
interrupts the smooth performance of behaviors, whereas, more
concrete construal beneﬁts task performance by (a) focusing
attention on the immediate demands of the present situation,
(b) reducing anxiety, and (c) requiring less effort and using up less
self-regulatory resources. For example, a soccer player would perform
better when focusing on how to take the penalty, rather than when
thinking about the implications of not scoring. Consistent with these
hypotheses, a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation is associated
with better problem solving (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins &
Moulds, 2005a). For example, prompting an abstract level of goal/
action identiﬁcation (questions like “Why did this problem happen?”)
impaired social problem solving in a recovered depressed group, whoperformed as well as never-depressed participants in a no-prompt
control condition, whereas prompting a concrete level of goal/action
identiﬁcation (questions like “How are you deciding what to do
next?”) ameliorated the problem-solving deﬁcit normally found in a
group of currently depressed patients (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002).
Moreover, the use of a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation
reduces anxiety and/or improves task performance, especially when
the task is considered difﬁcult or occurs under conditions of high
cognitive load (e.g., Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006; Vallacher et al., 1989;
Webb & Sheeran, 2003).
Furthermore, there is evidence that level of goal/action identiﬁ-
cation during mental simulations inﬂuences the effectiveness of
planning (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin & Armor, 1998). Students who
imagined the process of how to take steps towards obtaining a high
exam grade studied more and obtained better grades than students
who imagined the outcome of obtaining a high grade (i.e., focus on
ends, an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation) or students who
monitored their studying with no mental simulation (Pham & Taylor,
1999; Taylor et al., 1998). This effect of process simulation versus
outcome simulation on exam performance was mediated by a
reduction in anxiety and by increases in planning. Repeated imagining
of an ongoing stressful event, how it happened, and its associated
emotions produced more positive affect and greater report of active
coping after 1 week than imagining having resolved the situation or
not imagining the event at all (Rivkin & Taylor, 1999).
Thus, consistent with control theory and AIT, there is evidence that
adopting amore concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation is adaptive
to cope with personally relevant difﬁculties and to solve interpersonal
problems. Again, these ﬁndings suggest that the tendency for healthy
controls to become concrete in response to negativemood is adaptive,
suggesting that individuals effectively regulate their level of goal/
action identiﬁcation. However, being impaired in the ability to
become concrete to difﬁculties may be a risk factor for psychological
disorders.
4.5. Self-regulation, inhibition, and impulsivity
Poor self-regulation and impulsive responses are characteristic of a
number of psychological disorders including eating disorders, alcohol
and substance abuse disorders, manic episodes within bipolar
disorder, impulse-control disorders, and personality disorders. Thus,
if level of goal/action identiﬁcation causally inﬂuences self-regulation
and impulsivity, (dys)regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation
may be a factor relevant to the onset and/or maintenance of these
disorders. As noted earlier, control theory and AIT predict that an
abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation will increase self-control
and reduce failures of self-regulation. These theories propose that
level of goal/action identiﬁcation will inﬂuence self-regulation in
situations of self-control conﬂict that involve resisting temptation or
ignoring distraction, because in these situations there is a conﬂict
between beneﬁts at the more abstract level (e.g., long-term gain)
versus costs at the concrete level (e.g., short-term loss or pain). For
example, an individual with the abstract goal of “losing weight”, when
faced with a delicious-looking piece of cake, is more likely to resist
temptation if he adopts an abstract level of identiﬁcation focused on
long-term goals than a concrete level of identiﬁcation focused on the
immediate sensory experience. Similarly, Baumeister and Heatherton
(1996) proposed that one proximal cause of self-regulation failure is
the failure to focus awareness beyond the immediate stimuli, that is,
to fail to transcend the immediate situation by seeing it in the context
of more distal, abstract concerns. Consistent with this, Karniol and
Miller (1983) demonstrated that failure to delay gratiﬁcation was
often preceded by shifts in attention to the immediate reward.
Baumeister and Heatherton (1996) proposed that some impulsive
behavior (e.g., aggression) could be understand in terms of acting in
response to short-term concerns whilst failing to consider long-range
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further hypothesized that a “great deal of binge behavior, whether it
be shopping, gambling, eating, drinking, or having sex, seems to result
when people are seeking to keep their attention focused on
immediate, concrete stimuli as a means of keeping it away from
some threatening or upsetting thoughts” (Baumeister & Heatherton,
1996, p. 5). Thus, there is considerable theoretical rationale for level of
goal/action identiﬁcation inﬂuencing self-regulation in clinical con-
texts, with a concrete level-of-identiﬁcation implicated in poorer
resistance to temptation. Remember that within control theory
accounts, only the levels subordinate to the currently prepotent
operational level of goal/action identiﬁcation will be engaged — that
is, for an individual who is momentarily processing goals and events
at a relatively concrete level, there is little or no reference to higher-
order goals, and thus, the individual could easily act at odds to abstract
goals (and effectively during the time a more concrete level is
prepotent, higher-order goals are temporarily disconnected from the
present moment).
Consistent with these theories, a more abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is associated with less impulsivity and greater self-
control. First, a habitual tendency towards a more abstract level of
goal/action identiﬁcation was associated with a greater self-reported
tendency to persevere on a course of action, less self-reported
impulsiveness, and greater temporal stability in behavior (Vallacher
& Wegner, 1989). Moreover, in a sample of juvenile detainees,
individuals who tended to adopt amore abstract level of identiﬁcation
were less likely to have an offense record and less likely to experience
school trouble, suggesting an ability to forestall some negative
consequences of their behavior (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Second,
eating binges seem to be characterized by an immersion in immediate
sensation (an extremely concrete level of identiﬁcation) and a
cessation in monitoring the meanings and purpose of the behavior
(i.e., disengagement from more abstract levels of identiﬁcation,
Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). Third, impulsive and risky behavior
is associated with the narrow focus on the here-and-now that is
characteristic of a more concrete level of identiﬁcation. The tendency
to adopt a present time-perspective, in which immediate here-and-
now stimuli are the primary focus in determining actions, was highly
related to risky driving (e.g., speeding and drinking under the
inﬂuence of alcohol, Zimbardo, Keough & Boyd, 1997), to more
frequent smoking, consumption of alcohol, and drug use (Keough,
Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), and to more frequently missing submission
deadlines for academic work (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Although
these behaviors do not necessarily always reﬂect a failure of self-
control and could reﬂect the enactment of desired actions (albeit
whilst minimising their potential detrimental long-term effects), a
signiﬁcant proportion of drinking, drug use, risky behavior, etc.,
probably does reﬂect impulsive and contextually-driven actions at
odds with abstract personal goals. However these ﬁndings are limited
in that the measures are self-report and the ﬁndings are correlational,
leaving the causal direction between level of goal/action identiﬁcation
and poor self-regulation unresolved.
However, a number of experimental studies have shown that
manipulating level of goal/action identiﬁcation causally inﬂuences
self-control on a range of experimental tasks, with more abstract level
of identiﬁcation producing greater resistance to temptation thanmore
concrete level of identiﬁcation (Fujita & Han, 2009; Fujita et al., 2006;
Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). For example, relative to participants
primed into a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation by questions
asking “how?” they would enact particular goals, participants primed
into an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation by questions asking
“why?” they would adopt particular goals, demonstrated decreased
preferences for immediate over delayed outcomes, greater physical
endurance (holding a handgrip for signiﬁcantly longer) (Fujita et al.,
2006), and associated temptation (“candy bars”) with negativity on
an implicit association test (Fujita & Han, 2009). Similarly, describingsituations that involve self-control conﬂict (e.g., eating a piece of cake
when on a diet) in more abstract terms resulted in more negative
evaluations of temptations than when situations were described in
concrete terms (Fujita et al., 2006). Schmeichel and Vohs (2009)
demonstrated that afﬁrming the self at an abstract level (writing why
one pursues a particular personal value) resulted in more delay of
gratiﬁcation on a computer game than afﬁrming the self at a concrete
level (writing how one pursues personal values), and counteracted
depletion of self-regulatory resources by prior engagement in a self-
control task. Since depleting self-regulatory resources by prior
engagement in a self-control task causes more concrete level of
identiﬁcation (Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003), increases alcohol consump-
tion (Muraven, Collins & Neinhaus, 2002), and leads to loss of self-
control in eating (e.g., eating more unhealthy food, Vohs &
Heatherton, 2000), a more abstract level of identiﬁcation may
counteract such losses of self-control.
Thus, level of goal/action identiﬁcation is causally implicated in
inhibiting prepotent and impulsive responses (such as resisting
temptation and delaying gratiﬁcation) consistent with the theoretical
models described earlier. Since difﬁculties in inhibiting prepotent
responses are characteristic of various psychological disorders (e.g.,
binge eating), and impulsivity is among the strongest prospective
predictors of later addictive behaviors (de Wit, 2009), these ﬁndings
suggest that (dys)regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation may
inﬂuence symptoms in these disorders.
4.6. Procrastination, initiation of goal pursuit, and self-motivation
Difﬁculties in initiating goal pursuit is an important symptom
across those psychological disorders characterized by reduced
inactivity and avoidance such as major depression, for which loss of
motivation and difﬁculties making decisions are diagnostic criteria. A
number of theoretical perspectives suggest that a more concrete level
of identiﬁcation may be adaptive in initiating goal pursuit (in the
context when there is little prior procedural speciﬁcation from
abstract goals to the programs and sequences of behaviors necessary
to achieve the goal, such as when the goal pursuit is not well
established or well-practised). As noted earlier, settingmore concrete,
speciﬁc, and attainable sub-goals may facilitate the delivery of action
by providing immediate incentives and guides for performance
(Bandura & Schunk, 1981) and by reducing the delay of rewards,
whereas distal goals may be too far removed in time to effectively
mobilize effort or to direct what one does in the here-and-now.
Moreover, a concrete level of identiﬁcation that speciﬁes when,
where, and how an action will occur may facilitate goal pursuit and
initiation of action by transferring control of the behavior to cues in
the situational context rather than relying on individual volition
(Gollwitzer, 1999). This is conceptually equivalent to the argument re
impulsivity: adopting a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation as
the prepotent operational level transfers more control of a behavior to
contextual cues, such that less volitional effort/executive resources
are required to initiate it (or more effort required to inhibit it if at odds
with higher-order goals).
Consistent with these hypotheses, adopting a concrete level of
goal/action identiﬁcation can reduce procrastination and hastens the
initiation and execution of behaviors. First, forming concrete plans
concerning the when, where, and how of pursuing a goal leads to
earlier enactment of goal-directed behavior, quicker initiation of
responses, and better goal completion (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006;
Webb & Sheeran, 2003). Second, McCrea, Liberman, Trope and
Sherman (2008) found that manipulating level of goal/action
identiﬁcation causally inﬂuenced extent of procrastination. In three
studies, participants were asked to respond to a questionnaire via
email within 3 weeks. In each study, the questionnaire was designed
to induce either an abstract or a concrete level of processing. In all
three studies, participants in the concrete condition returned the
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condition. Third, Bandura and Schunk (1981) found that for children
who had difﬁculties in mathematical tasks, a program of self-directed
learning was more effective when participants were provided with
proximal goals, relative to children assigned distal goals or no goals at
all. In the proximal subgoal condition, children progressed rapidly in
self-directed learning, achieved substantial mastery of mathematical
operations, showed greater task persistence, and developed a sense of
personal efﬁcacy and intrinsic interest in mathematical activities,
whereas distal goals had little effect. Similarly, Stock and Cervone
(1990) found that the assignment of a proximal subgoal (relative to
no subgoal) on a complex problem-solving task increased initial
strength of self-efﬁcacy for completing the problem, which in turn led
to greater persistence on the task.
5. Evidence that level of goal/action identiﬁcation is abnormal in
psychological disorders
The previous section provides evidence that level of goal/action
identiﬁcation can causally inﬂuence symptoms and processes associ-
ated with psychological disorders, with the implication that dysre-
gulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation could contribute to
psychopathology. The evidence presented is broadly supportive of the
distinctions predicted in Table 1. However, because the majority of
these studies used non-clinical samples (see exceptions in patients
with major depression, Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds,
2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004), there still remains the
question of whether level of goal/action identiﬁcation is actually
dysregulated in psychological disorders. There are two types of
evidence for dysregulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation. First,
there may be evidence that there is an asymmetrical bias in the level
of goal/action identiﬁcation adopted in a psychological disorder
relative to controls. For example, the ﬁnding that individuals with a
particular psychological disorder tend to adopt a more abstract level
of identiﬁcation for negative outcomes and events than controls
would indicate that level of goal/action identiﬁcation is abnormal and
probably dysfunctional in that disorder, since the level of goal/action
identiﬁcation adopted would be at odds with the level of goal/action
identiﬁcation found to be most adaptive. Moreover, any asymmetrical
bias towards one level of goal/action identiﬁcation implies reduced
responsiveness to situational context and impaired regulation, e.g., a
bias towards abstract identiﬁcation of negative events suggests that
level of goal/action identiﬁcation does not become more concrete in
response to difﬁculty. Second, there may be direct evidence of such
impaired regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation, which
requires the demonstration that level of goal/action identiﬁcation
does not shift with changing circumstances (e.g., mood inductions) in
the functional way that is typically observed in healthy controls. This
section summarizes both types of evidence across a selected range of
psychological disorders.
5.1. Major depression
There is extensive evidence that the level of goal/action identiﬁ-
cation adopted in major depression is abnormal and dysfunctional,
with patients with depression tending to adopt more abstract levels of
goal/action identiﬁcation, at least for negative information, than non-
depressed controls. First, relative to non-depressed individuals,
currently depressed and formerly depressed individuals tend to
overgeneralize from a single negative event, such that a single failure
is represented in terms of a global and characterological personal
inadequacy (e.g., “I am worthless”, an abstract level of identiﬁcation
at the self-concept level), rather than in terms of speciﬁc behavior
(a concrete level of identiﬁcation) (e.g., Carver & Ganellen, 1983;
Carver, La Voie, Kuhl, & Ganellen, 1988; Eisner, Johnson & Carver,
2008; Ganellen, 1988; Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Negative general-ization prospectively predicts increases in depressive symptoms in
conjunction with negative events (Carver, 1998) and mediates the
effects of failure on emotional reactivity (Brown & Dutton, 1995;
Kernis, Brockner & Frankel, 1989). Thus, an abstract level of
identiﬁcation is implicated in the maintenance of symptoms.
Second, as noted earlier, depressive rumination is characterized by
an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation (Watkins, 2008). Such
depressive rumination maintains over general autobiographical
memory recall and global negative self-evaluations, relative to
distraction or more concrete self-focus (Rimes & Watkins, 2005;
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). Third, there is evidence of reduced
concreteness of thinking in depressed patients when thinking about
problems (Cribb, Moulds & Carter, 2006; Watkins & Moulds, 2007).
Fourth, Emmons (1992) found that individual differences in preferred
level of goal/action identiﬁcation for personal strivings (important
recurring goals) and spontaneous thoughts were associated with
psychological well-being, with more abstract thoughts and more
abstract personal strivings associated with greater negative affect
assessed over 21 days using an experience samplingmethodology and
with more depressed symptoms.
Fifth, studies of visual perspective in depression also suggest that
depression involves a bias towards an abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation. Depressed adults (Lemogne et al., 2006), and formerly
depressed patients (Bergouignan et al., 2008; Kuyken & Moulds,
2009) are characterized by a tendency to retrieve a greater proportion
of observer memories than non-depressed individuals. Given evi-
dence that visual perspective is functionally equivalent to level of
goal/action identiﬁcation (Libby et al., 2009), this tendency towards
an observer perspective in major depression is further evidence that
depressed patients tend towards a more abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation for personally relevant information. Moreover, adoption
of an observer perspective seems to be associated with attempts to
evaluate oneself and with depressive rumination (Kuyken & Moulds,
2009; Libby, Eibach & Gilovich, 2005; Williams & Moulds, 2007),
consistent with an abstract level of identiﬁcation. Kuyken and Moulds
(2009) found that vantage perspective was a moderator of treatment
response to mindfulness-based cognitive therapy: participants who
reported more ﬁeld perspective memories pre-treatment had lower
levels of post-treatment depression, controlling for baseline levels of
depression.
Thus, there is extensive evidence indicating that patients with
major depression tend to adopt a more abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation, which is at odds with the hypothesized and observed
functional linkage between sad affect and problems and a concrete
level of goal/action identiﬁcation found in non-depressed partici-
pants. Moreover, there is both experimental evidence (e.g., Watkins &
Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a) and longitudinal prospec-
tive evidence that a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation
(Carver, 1998; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Williams et al., 2007) leads
to more adaptive consequences in depressed patients, suggesting
that: (a) abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation may contribute
to depression, rather than simply be a consequence of depression;
(b) there is tendency for an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation
to become prepotent despite being maladaptive.
Based on this evidence, Watkins (2008) hypothesized that
currently depressed individuals are impaired in ﬂexibly regulating
level of goal/action identiﬁcation in response to situational demands,
and consequently are less likely to use concrete representations in
response to increases in sad mood. There is preliminary evidence
consistent with this dysregulation hypothesis. First, when asked to
generate counterfactual thoughts about a negative event, individuals
with mild-to-moderate depressive symptoms generated a more
concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation focused on speciﬁc,
controllable behaviors, relative to non-depressed individuals and
severely depressed individuals, whereas severely depressed indivi-
duals generated more a abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation
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non-depressed and mildly depressed individuals (Markman & Miller,
2006). Thus, mild depressive symptoms are associated with the
adaptive regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation in response to
mood, but more extreme depressive symptoms are associated with
dysregulation of this process.
Second,Watkins, Moberly, andMoulds (submitted for publication)
directly tested this hypothesis by measuring level of goal/action
identiﬁcation on the Behavioral Identiﬁcation Form after happy and
sad mood inductions in never-depressed controls and currently
depressed patients. Consistent with Watkins (2008) hypothesis,
increases in sad mood were associated with shifts towards more a
more concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation in never-depressed
individuals, but not in depressed patients. These ﬁndings suggest that
the proposed functional association consistently found between sad
mood and level of goal/action identiﬁcation is impaired in major
depression.
Third, Takano and Tanno (2010) used an experience sampling
method to investigate the relationship between self-focus, concrete-
ness of thinking, depressive symptoms and concurrent negative affect
in daily life. Thirty-one undergraduates recorded their negative affect,
ruminative self-focus and concreteness of thinking eight times a day
for 1 week. Multilevel modeling found that individuals with increas-
ing levels of depressive symptoms engaged in more abstract thinking
in daily life. Furthermore, there was a signiﬁcant negative correlation
between intra-individual standard deviations of concreteness and
depression, suggesting that concreteness ﬂuctuates less as levels of
depression increases, which the authors interpreted as indicating that
“individuals with increasing levels of depression might have a
malfunction in switching their levels of concreteness” (Takano &
Tanno, 2010, p.424). Moreover, consistent with the hypothesis that
level of goal/action identiﬁcation may inﬂuence the negative
consequences of repetitive thought, ruminative self-focus was
signiﬁcantly positively associated with negative affect but only
when associated with abstract thinking.
In summary, major depression is associated with a bias towards
adopting a more abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation, especially
in the context of negative affect and limited goal progress, even when
this is unhelpful. This pattern is consistent with and helps to explain
the wider symptomatology of depression such as overgeneralization,
rumination, procrastination, and reduced activity. Moreover, there is
preliminary evidence that this bias may reﬂect dysregulation of level
of goal/action identiﬁcation in response to changes inmood. However,
to date, the level of goal/action identiﬁcation adopted in response to
positive information has not been evaluated — the ﬁndings of
Marigold et al. (2007) that LSE individuals tend to identify positive
events (compliments) concretely suggests that patients with major
depression may act similarly.
5.2. Bipolar disorder and mania
When considering level of goal/action identiﬁcation within bipolar
disorder, it is important to distinguish between the level of goal/
action identiﬁcation adopted in an episode of bipolar depression, an
episode of mania, or during a period of euthymic mood and, where
possible, to control for each set of symptoms. The majority of studies
have tended to examine participants in an euthymic state and thus
make it hard to assess what the level of goal/action identiﬁcation
would be within a depressed or manic episode.
The theories and evidence already reviewed suggest various
(potentially complementary) hypotheses concerning the level of
goal/action identiﬁcation adopted in bipolar disorder. First, it is
plausible that bipolar depression would show a similar level of goal/
action identiﬁcation to unipolar depression, i.e., a tendency to bemore
abstract in response to negative outcomes. The extant evidence is
consistent with this hypothesis, since the level of current depressivesymptoms in individuals with bipolar disorder is correlated with
measures of more abstract levels of identiﬁcation such as negative
overgeneralization and depressive rumination (Eisner et al., 2008;
Johnson, McKenzie & McMurrich, 2008).
Second, given that distractability, impulsivity, and engaging in
high risk behaviors are diagnostic criteria for mania, it could be
hypothesized that mania is characterized by the adoption of a
concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation in response to appetitive
and rewarding stimuli, resulting in less self-control under these
circumstances (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989; Zimbardo et al., 1997).
Such an analysis is consistent with the clinical impression that
patients in a manic episode pay less heed to the long-term
consequences of their actions. However, to date, the level of goal/
action identiﬁcation during a manic or hypomanic episode has not
been assessed, nor has the level of identiﬁcation typically adopted in
response to appetitive stimuli.
Third, it is a plausible hypothesis that vulnerability for mania is
characterized by a propensity towards exaggerated abstract level of
goal/action identiﬁcation of positive outcomes, leading to elevated
positivemood and grandiosity (i.e., more extreme version of high self-
esteem individuals seen in Marigold et al., 2007). Consistent with this
hypothesis, in an undergraduate sample, increased risk for develop-
ment of bipolar disorder, as indexed by elevated scores on the
Hypomanic Personality Scale, was signiﬁcantly associated with
positive generalization, deﬁned as the tendency to generalize from a
good experience in one domain of life to broader aspects of life (Eisner
et al., 2008; Carver & Johnson, 2009). Similarly, individuals with
elevated hypomania scores and individuals with the diagnosis of
bipolar disorder reported an elevated tendency towards positive
rumination in response to positive affect relative to individuals with
the diagnosis of major depression or healthy controls (Carver &
Johnson, 2009; Johnson et al., 2008).
Thus, there is preliminary evidence that vulnerability for mania is
associated with a more abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation for
positive outcomes, whereas bipolar depression is associated with a
more abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation for negative outcomes.
However, not all this data was collected in a diagnosed sample, nor was
the effect of mood state (i.e., in depressed or manic episode) examined.
Given the literature reviewed earlier, one would expect level of goal/
action identiﬁcation to changewith varyingmood state— as such, itwill
be critical to assess level of goal/action identiﬁcation across mania,
depression, and euthymia in patients with bipolar disorder, to
determine how it dynamically changes with circumstances.
5.3. Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD)
Since pathological worry is a primary and deﬁning symptom of
GAD, the evidence reviewed byWatkins (2008) that pathological RT is
characterized by an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation
suggests that GAD is also characterized by a predisposition towards
adopting an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation as the
prepotent operational level, for negative events. A similar prediction
is made by the reduced concreteness theory, which proposes that
worry is predominantly experienced in a more abstract-verbal form
rather than in a more concrete-visual imagery form, and that this
reduced concreteness leads to negative consequences for problem
solving and affect regulation (Borkovec et al., 1998; Stöber, 1998).
Consistent with this theory, worry is predominantly experienced in a
verbal form rather than in images (Borkovec et al., 1998; Borkovec,
Robinson, Pruzinsky & Depree, 1983). Moreover, elaborations of
problems about which participants worry are independently and
blindly rated as more abstract and less concrete than problems about
which participants do not worry for patients with GAD (Stöber, 1998;
Stöber & Borkovec, 2002; Stöber, Tepperwien & Staak, 2000). Thus,
patients with GAD demonstrate a biased tendency towards a more
abstract level of processing. Given that in healthy controls, negative
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identiﬁcation, this is indirect evidence that level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is dysregulated in GAD, although there has not been
any direct test of how level of goal/action identiﬁcation shifts in
response to changing circumstances or mood state. Moreover,
experimental studies suggest that this more abstract level is
associated with less emotional processing, reduced cardiovascular
responses to emotional stimuli, and poor problem solving (Borkovec
et al., 1998).
5.4. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
There is also preliminary evidence that PTSD is associated with a
bias towards abstract processing of traumatic events, based on
evidence that implicates (a) abstract rumination and (b) an observer
perspective in the maintenance of PTSD. First, there is evidence that
abstract rumination is an important psychopathological process in
PTSD (see Ehring, Frank & Ehlers, 2008; Ehring & Watkins, 2008;
Watkins, 2008), which prospectively predicts PTSD symptoms.
Importantly, this research identiﬁed that the element of rumination
associated with PTSD severity was repeated asking of “why” and
“what if” type questions — that is, an abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation focusing on the meaning, implications, and conse-
quences of the trauma. Moreover, experimental studies suggest that
abstract rumination (characterized by asking “why”?) contributes to
the maintenance of symptoms in PTSD, such as duration of negative
affect and number of negative intrusions, following exposure to an
analogue stressor such as ﬁlm footage of road trafﬁc accidents (Ehring
et al., 2008; Ehring et al., 2009).
Second, there is evidence that PTSD is characterized by a tendency
towards an observer perspective when recalling autobiographical
memories of the trauma. Trauma-exposed individuals with PTSD
recall more observer trauma memories than those without PTSD
(McIsaac & Eich, 2004). Moreover, Kenny et al. (2009) found that in a
large prospective longitudinal study, initially recalling the trauma
from an observer perspective was related to more severe PTSD
symptoms 1 year later, and, shifting from a ﬁeld to an observer
perspective a year after trauma was associated with greater PTSD
symptoms at 12 months. Since the observer perspective is function-
ally connected with an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation, this
is evidence that PTSD is characterized by a more abstract level of goal/
action identiﬁcation of trauma and that this abstract level of
identiﬁcation maintains negative affect and slows recovery.
5.5. Social anxiety
There is initial evidence that social anxiety is associated with a bias
towards an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation in response to
anxiety-provoking events. First, post-event rumination (“post-event
processing” “post-mortem thinking”) deﬁned as “RT about subjective
experiences during a recent social interaction, including self-apprai-
sals and external evaluations of partners and other details involving
the event” (Kashdan & Roberts, 2007, p. 286) has been hypothesized
to contribute to the development and maintenance of social anxiety
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Compared to low-
anxious controls, individuals with high social anxiety and patients with
a diagnosis of social anxiety demonstrate signiﬁcantly more post-event
abstract RT following social interactions, performing mental “post-
mortems” on the consequences of the interaction and evaluating their
performance (e.g., Abbott & Rapee, 2004; Kocovski, Endler, Rector &
Flett, 2005; Mellings & Alden, 2000). Moreover, Wong and Moulds
(2009) found that following a social-evaluative task, rumination
maintained anxiety in both high and low socially anxious controls
relative to distraction. Furthermore, Vassilopoulos and Watkins (2009)
found that in individuals high in fear of negative evaluation, a concrete
rumination condition decreased ratings of the self as worthless andincompetent, pre- to post-manipulation, whereas an abstract rumina-
tion condition (thinking about themeanings and implications of current
feelings)maintained such negative self-judgments, implicating abstract
rumination in the maintenance of negative cognition.
Second, there is evidence that individuals with social anxiety are
signiﬁcantly more likely than controls to adopt an observer
perspective when recalling difﬁcult social situations (e.g., Hackmann,
Clark & McManus, 2000; Wells, Clark & Ahmad, 1998; Wells &
Papageorgiou, 1999). Moreover, consistent with the theories and
evidence suggesting that level of goal/action identiﬁcation can
inﬂuence affect and performance, there is evidence that the visual
perspective adopted causally inﬂuences symptoms of social anxiety
(Spurr & Stopa, 2003). When high and low socially anxious
participants gave speeches, adopting the observer perspective for
one speech, and adopting the ﬁeld perspective for the other speech,
use of the observer perspective produced more frequent negative
thoughts, more safety behaviors, and worse self-evaluation of
performance in both groups, relative to the ﬁeld perspective, as well
as a strong trend towards greater anxiety (Spurr & Stopa, 2003). The
observer perspective involved instructions to imagine what you look
like and how you might be coming across to anyone watching (i.e., an
abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation), whereas the ﬁeld
perspective involved instructions to be aware of details in the
environment (i.e., a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation, cf.
Vallacher et al., 1987).
5.6. Suicide and suicidal behavior
Consistent with escape theory, there is evidence that suicidal
individuals are characterized by an abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation (i.e., focused on meanings for self) and high levels of
self-awareness in response to negative events, which is then followed
by a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation (i.e., focused on
immediate sensation) at the point of a suicide attempt (see Baumeister,
1990). In particular, there is evidence that suicide attempters are
characterized by concrete thinking that is focused on immediate
movements and sensations, and guided by immediate proximal goals,
rather than on more abstract implications and distal goals. Baumeister
(1990) reviews evidence that genuine suicide notes tend to be
relatively concrete, with a narrow immediate focus, speciﬁc instruc-
tions, and more references to concrete objects, than simulated notes.
5.7. Addiction: alcohol and substance abuse/dependence disorders
When considering addictive problems, such as alcohol abuse/
dependence, it is important to distinguish between different patterns
and functions of symptoms. Difﬁculties could take the form of
(a) problems in resisting temptation in response to appetitive stimuli
leading to substance abuse; (b) impulsive binging that is negatively
reinforced as a means of avoiding distress; and (c) a consistent,
habitual pattern of excessive substance use such as found in alcohol
dependence. Different patterns of level of goal/action identiﬁcation
may relate to these different symptom patterns.
Many theories of addiction propose that addictive behaviors
depend upon the relative balance between (i) automatic associations
within an impulsive appetitive system such that the presence of an
appetitive stimuli (whether an actual physical object or a mental
representation, e.g., a craving) activates approach tendencies and
(ii) reﬂective processing focused on the long-term consequences of
such action, which controls these automatic tendencies (see Wiers,
Field, & Stacy, in press). Similarly, Bickel and Marsch (2001) argued
that impairments in impulsive decision making, such that behavior
tends to be inﬂuenced disproportionately by its immediate conse-
quences rather than by delayed consequences, are implicated in drug
and alcohol abuse. Thus, within these theories, a currently prepotent
concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation would heighten the impact
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whereas an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation would heighten
the impact of the reﬂective system. Consistent with this analysis,
Wiers et al. (in press) predicted that focusing on the sensory (i.e.,
concrete) rather than on the health (i.e., abstract) aspects of an
addictive behavior should activate impulsive appetitive processes.
Consistent with these hypotheses, there is evidence that a concrete
level of goal/action identiﬁcation is associated with more frequent
consumption of alcohol and increased drug use (Keough et al., 1999).
Second, studies assessing “delay discounting”, which indexes the
extent to which an individual chooses smaller immediate (hypothet-
ical) rewards (e.g., money and alcohol) in preference to larger delayed
(also hypothetical) rewards, ﬁnd that heavy alcohol use, cocaine
abuse, and heroin abuse are associated with marked discounting of
delayed rewards, i.e., a preference for immediate gratiﬁcation,
consistent with a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation focused
on the here-and-now that has no reference to higher-order abstract
goals focused on distant consequences (e.g., Kirby & Petry, 2004;
Petry, 2001; Rossow, 2008; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998). Third, there
is evidence that people sometimes manage to stop severe addictive
behavior after an important emotional event that makes the
consequences and implications of the continued addictive behavior
salient in relation to personal goals, that is, when the individual begins
to identify their behavior more abstractly (Miller, 1998).
The literature on craving is also consistent with level of goal/action
identiﬁcation inﬂuencing impulsive appetitive behaviors. Cravings are
highly intense “wishes or urges to gain pleasure, relieve discomfort,
satisfy a want, or to engage in consummatory behavior associated
with these outcomes”, and often involve images about the attractive
features of the appetitive object or activity (Kavanagh, Andrade &
May, 2005, p. 446). Craving is a reliable predictor of relapse to alcohol
and drug use among addicts seeking treatment (Bottlender & Soyka,
2004; Flannery, Poole, Gallop & Volpicelli, 2003; Pahwal, Hyman &
Sinha, 2008). Kavanagh et al. (2005) proposed that intense or
prolonged craving results when intrusive thoughts that are activated
by learned associations to internal or external antecedent events (e.g.,
hunger and external cues) are then further mentally elaborated
through appetitive rumination. Unlike depressive rumination, such
appetitive rumination is argued to typically include “the construction
of sensory images that often are vivid and richly textured, lending the
experience a sensory immediacy” (Kavanagh et al., 2005), that is,
involving a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation of appetitive
stimuli. Consistent with this hypothesis, Kavanagh et al. (2005)
reviewed evidence that concrete imagery is an important component
of craving, that imagery elicits craving, and that unrelated imagery
tasks reduce craving. Recently, Kavanagh, May and Andrade (2009)
found that imagery of taste (which has to be experienced in a ﬁeld
perspective), vision and swallowing were common during craving
episodes in patients receiving treatment for alcohol abuse or
dependence, that more frequent imagery was associated with
stronger craving, and that self-monitored daily craving frequency
was associated with daily alcohol consumption.
Moreover, consistent with the escape theory account's view that
substance/alcohol abuse may result from a concrete level of goal/
action identiﬁcation adopted as a means to escape from negative
abstract self-evaluations, there is evidence linking distress and
depressive rumination to increased drinking and substance use.
Nolen-Hoeksema and Harrell (2002) found that high ruminators were
more likely to report drinking to cope with distress and greater
problematic substance use. In a prospective longitudinal sample of
496 female adolescents, rumination predicted future increases in
bulimic and substance abuse symptoms, as well as onset of major
depression, binge eating, and substance abuse (Nolen-Hoeksema,
Stice, Wade & Bohon, 2007). In a sample of 603 community
participants, distress and rumination partially mediated the relation-
ship between self-reported childhood sexual abuse and consumptivebehaviors such as increased use of food, alcohol, drugs in response to
feeling upset (Sarin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010), suggesting that
individuals adopt binge eating and drinking in order to cope with
distress and the effects of rumination.
Furthermore, the effects of alcohol itself are consistent with the
hypothesis that level of goal/action identiﬁcation is dysregulated in
addictive behavior. There is evidence that alcohol shifts individuals to
a more concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation, consistent with the
idea that alcohol may be used as a means to escape abstract self-
evaluations (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991). Steele and Josephs
(1990, p. 923) reviewed evidence that alcohol causes “alcohol
myopia” deﬁned as “a state of short-sightedness in which superﬁcially
understood, immediate aspects of experience have a disproportionate
inﬂuence on behavior and emotion”. These ﬁndings are also
consistent with proposals that the acute effects of alcohol feed into
the processes maintaining alcohol use (e.g., Field, Schoenmakers &
Wiers, 2008), by interfering with the regulation of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation in a way that becomes self-perpetuating. These ﬁndings
also suggest how co-morbid alcohol use may impact on dysregulation
of level of goal/action identiﬁcation in other disorders, leading to
further impulsive behaviors (e.g., heightening the risk for suicidal
attempts).
Finally, Wegner, Vallacher and Dizadji (1989) provided an AIT
analysis of habitual problem drinking, such as found in alcohol
dependence, which proposes that as a behavior becomes more
automatic, it will be construed more abstractly such that experienced
or excessive drinkers will tend to identify their drinking at an abstract
level of goal/action identiﬁcation in terms of its meanings (relaxation
and relieving tension), whereas novice drinkers will identify their
drinking at a more concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation focused
on the details of the action. AIT hypothesizes that a concrete
identiﬁcation of a behavior provides more opportunity to monitor,
change, and interrupt the behavior because it is broken down into
relatively short segments of action (“lifting a glass” and “swallowing”)
than an abstract identiﬁcation organized in terms of global products
like “relieving tension”, such that a greater number of drinks may be
required before the identiﬁed action is complete in an abstract
identiﬁcation. Consistent with this analysis, Wegner et al. (1989)
found that increasing alcohol use is associated with decreasing
awareness of the details of drinking, such that inpatients with chronic
alcohol problems provided more abstract descriptions of their
drinking behavior than college undergraduates.
There is thus preliminary evidence consistent with abnormal level
of goal/action identiﬁcation in addiction, substance and alcohol
disorders. However, this research still lacks (i) a ﬁne-grained analysis
of how the different levels of goal/action identiﬁcation for different
contexts interact (e.g., the relationship between concrete level of
identiﬁcation for appetitive stimuli and abstract level of identiﬁcation
for habitual drinking behavior — perhaps the former associated with
binging and the later with dependence); (ii) close examination of the
temporal sequence predicted by escape theory (negative abstract
level of goal/action identiﬁcation leads to concrete level of goal/action
identiﬁcation, to escape discrepancy at level of higher-order goals),
and (iii) is limited by being mainly cross-sectional, limiting conclu-
sions about causality.
5.8. Binge eating and eating disorders
Following an extensive review, Heatherton and Baumeister (1991,
p. 98) concluded that “it appears that an eating binge is accompanied
by focus on immediate stimuli, low-level or deconstructed thinking
(i.e., short-term focus on movements and sensations) and rejection of
meaningful thought (resulting in concrete, rigid, and dichotomous
thinking).” Thus, the experience of an eating binge is characterized by
a concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation becoming prepotent,
which by function of reducing reference to higher levels in the goal
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diagnostic criterion for bulimia nervosa and binge eating disorder, this
indicates that a bias towards a concrete level of goal/action
identiﬁcation when faced with appetitive food-related cues may be
present in both disorders. As noted earlier, also consistent with escape
theory, abstract rumination predicts subsequent binge eating (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2007). There is also evidence that obese women
show greater delay discounting than healthy-weight women (Weller,
Cook, Avsar & Cox, 2008), consistent with a concrete level of goal/
action identiﬁcation for appetitive stimuli being associated with
increased consumption.
6. Discussion
The data reviewed above suggests three lines of evidence for
considering that dysregulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation
may be a transdiagnostic process. First, there is evidence that different
levels of goal/action identiﬁcation have distinct functional conse-
quences and that in non-clinical controls, level of goal/action
identiﬁcation appears to be regulated in a ﬂexible and adaptive way
to match the level of goal/action identiﬁcation to circumstances. This
pattern of ﬁndings suggests that regulation of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is a normal and adaptive process, and, thus, a good
candidate for a process that may be transdiagnostic, and that, if
dysregulated, may contribute to the onset and/or maintenance of
disorders. Second, there is evidence that level of goal/action
identiﬁcation inﬂuences symptoms and processes involved in psy-
chological disorders. Experimental manipulations of level of goal/
action identiﬁcation inﬂuence emotional response to failure, the
consequences of repetitive thought, delay of gratiﬁcation and
resistance to temptation, problem solving, and procrastination. As
these outcomes are characteristic of a range of psychological disorders
and causally contribute to psychopathology, this suggests that level of
goal/action identiﬁcation could be a variable with transdiagnostic
implications. Third, there is evidence that level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is biased in certain psychological disorders, with
evidence that there is an elevated tendency to adopt more abstract
levels of goal/action identiﬁcation for negative outcomes and events
in depression, GAD, PTSD, and social anxiety, and evidence that
addictions and binge eating involve an elevated tendency for concrete
levels of goal/action identiﬁcation for appetitive stimuli. The ﬁrst and
second lines of evidence are the most well-developed — the evidence
for abnormal and dysregulated level of goal/action identiﬁcation in
psychological disorders is preliminary and requires further develop-
ment. Nonetheless, the convergent evidence that level of goal/action
identiﬁcation can inﬂuence symptoms and that level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is abnormal in several psychological disorders relative
to controls provides preliminary support for the hypothesis that
dysregulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation may be a trans-
diagnostic process.
In sum, although these ﬁndings need to be treated with caution,
they indicate that the regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation
could inﬂuence a wide range of psychological disorders and that this
hypothesis is worthy of further investigation. With respect to the
deﬁnitions utilised by Harvey et al. (2004) when assessing the quality
of the evidence for transdiagnostic processes, these ﬁndings suggest
that dysregulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation is a possible
transdiagnostic process (deﬁned when the majority of the evidence,
which must be of at least moderate quality, indicates that the process
is present in at least two disorders). There is moderate quality
evidence for dysregulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation in
depression, GAD, PTSD, and social anxiety. In order to conﬁrm that
dysregulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation is a deﬁnite
transdiagnostic process, further research is required to examine if
this dysregulation is found in all of the disorders in which it has been
investigated.Although this review has found much data that is consistent with
the hypotheses derived from control theory and AIT, it is important to
acknowledge key limitations in the data, and areas that require
further research. Critically, much of the evidence marshalled was not
derived from studies designed to test the current hypothesis, but from
studies with other intentions. Thus, there is a need for more direct
tests of the hypothesis. Moreover, there are many gaps in our relevant
knowledge re level of goal/action identiﬁcation and psychopathology.
First, whilst there is a reasonable amount of evidence for mood
disorders and anxiety disorders, other disorders including alcohol/
substance abuse, eating disorders, impulse-control disorders, and
psychosis are less well studied. Second, there is a key need to examine
the level of goal/action identiﬁcation in response to both positive and
negative outcomes, and across a range of targets (e.g., positive and
negative events; appetitive and aversive stimuli, familiar and
unfamiliar behaviors). For example, much of the data reported for
mood and anxiety disorders suggests a tendency towards a more
abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation for negative events and
outcomes, but it is important to determine what level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is utilised in response to positive events and outcomes
to establish if there is a selective bias towards abstract level of
identiﬁcation of negative outcomes or a more general tendency to be
abstract. Third, the theoretical models and emerging evidence all
predict a direct effect of level of goal/action identiﬁcation on delay of
gratiﬁcation, impulsivity, and resistance to temptation — however, to
date, this is under-investigated in relevant psychological disorders,
such as eating disorders, addictions, impulse-control disorders and
bipolar disorder. The majority of clinical data available is relevant to
examining the maladaptive effects of an abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation — for a full test of the current hypothesis, it is also
necessary to test the hypothesized pathological effects of a concrete
level of goal/action identiﬁcation when used inappropriately.
Fourth, and critically, despite evidence that level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is abnormal in some disorders, the key hypothesis that
the regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation is impaired has
only been directly tested in major depression. The evidence of a bias
towards abstract identiﬁcations of negative concerns in GAD, PTSD,
and social anxiety suggests that these disorders may also involve
impaired regulation of level of goal/action identiﬁcation, such that the
level of goal/action identiﬁcation does not become more concrete as
circumstances become more difﬁcult or mood becomes more
negative. To test this possibility, a similar methodology to that used
by Watkins et al. (submitted for publication) needs to be used within
these anxiety disorders. Fifth, although there is some evidence in
mood and anxiety disorders that level of goal/action identiﬁcation
predicts or inﬂuences symptoms, the direction of the causal
relationship between level of goal/action identiﬁcation and symptoms
needs further examination across all disorders. Sixth, as noted earlier,
the current analysis has focused on a particular operationalization of
abstraction: whether a goal, action, or event is represented in terms of
the means for how it is implemented (concrete goal/action identiﬁ-
cation and lower in control hierarchy) or in terms of its ends and
consequences of why it is implemented (abstract goal/action
identiﬁcation and higher in control hierarchy). This operationalization
is the one most consistent with the control theory approach, enables
clear predictions derived from this theoretical account, and accurately
reﬂects the majority of the evidence presented. However, this does
not preclude the possibility that other conceptualizations or features
of abstraction (most notably the multiple dimensions of abstraction
within construal level theory, e.g., primary versus secondary char-
acteristics, pro versus cons), may have different implications for
adaptive behavior and psychological disorder than levels of goal/
action identiﬁcation (means versus ends), such as abstract processing
facilitating the solution of certain difﬁcult problems involving lateral
thinking. However, to my knowledge, at this juncture, other than the
control theory approach, there are not coherent theoretical models
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abstraction and psychopathology, nor can account for the extant
evidence reviewed here. Nonetheless, further examination of differ-
ent operationalizations of abstraction may be warranted.
If correct, the hypothesis that dysregulation of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is a transdiagnostic process contributing to different
psychological disorders would have a number of important theoret-
ical implications. First, the theoretical accounts underpinning the
hypothesis of dysregulated level of goal/action identiﬁcation provide
a useful integrative framework that draws together a number of
observations and processes in psychopathology, including repetitive
thought, psychological distance, experiential avoidance, and visual
perspective. For example, the conceptualization of anxiety disorders
as involving a tendency towards an abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation for negative events can simultaneously account for
increased pathological worry, experiential avoidance, an observer
perspective, and poor problem solving, since all of these outcomes are
inﬂuenced by level of goal/action identiﬁcation. Second, this approach
indicates the interconnectedness of these variables and predicts that
manipulating one will lead to changes in another, e.g., since changes
in psychological distance inﬂuence level of goal/action identiﬁcation,
this framework would predict differential effects on these outcomes
when considering events at different temporal or spatial distance.
Third, the current approach has the potential to encompass both
internalizing disorders characterized by passivity (e.g., depression)
and externalizing disorders characterized by impulsivity (e.g.,
addiction). Fourth, the focus on regulation of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation highlights the value of considering sensitivity to context
and ability to shift processing in response to context as a key variable
within psychopathology. This theoretical approach makes clear that a
particular level of goal/action identiﬁcation is not intrinsically
adaptive or maladaptive but that its functionality will depend on
context and ﬂexibility. Thus, the current hypothesis is a speciﬁc
operationalization of the proposal that psychological ﬂexibility is a
key dimension in psychological health, and that rigidity or “stuckness”
in cognitive responses is a vulnerability factor for disorder.
The hypothesis that dysregulation of level of goal/action identiﬁ-
cation is a transdiagnostic process also has several clinical implica-
tions. First, like other transdiagnostic processes, it may have beneﬁts
for understanding the high rates of co-morbidity across psychological
disorders. If as the data suggests, inﬂexibility in shifting level of goal/
action identiﬁcationwith a tendency to get stuck at an abstract level of
goal/action identiﬁcation for negative concerns is common to mood
disorders and anxiety disorders, this could, in part, account for their
elevated co-morbidity, and interventions to change level of goal/
action identiﬁcationmay reduce both anxiety and depression. Second,
understanding this process may facilitate greater transfer of theoret-
ical and treatment advances between disorders.
Third, as noted above, the current approach emphasizes a focus on
function, response to context, and ﬂexibility, rather than reifying one
response as “good” and another response as “bad”. Such an approach is
consistentwith recent treatment interventions thatemphasise adopting
a functional–contextual and process perspective (e.g., acceptance and
commitment therapy, ACT, Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999; behavioral
activation, BA,Martell, Addis& Jacobson, 2001; rumination-focusedCBT,
RFCBT, Watkins et al., 2007). Approaches that utilise a functional–
contextual approach may be one means to help people realize their
patterns of response, and to promote the ﬂexible use of level of goal/
action identiﬁcation in response to different circumstances: The
development of psychological ﬂexibility is an explicit goal of ACT; BA
involves practice of adoption of alternative actions in response to
difﬁculties, and RFCBT explicitly coaches ruminators to shift away from
their predominant abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation to adopt a
more concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation during self-focus.
Moreover, this analysis encourages clinicians to assess how well a
patient can shift their level of goal/action identiﬁcation to particularcircumstances and then to coach patients to correct any imbalance in
their functional change in level of goal/action identiﬁcation, so they can
develop more ﬂexibility in adopting the level of goal/action identiﬁca-
tion most functional for the current circumstances. The current review
suggests that in some circumstances, itmay be beneﬁcial to encourage a
concrete level of goal/action identiﬁcation to negative outcomes (e.g.,
focus on how an event happened and how a goal could be pursued for
depressed patients when ruminating) but in others, it may be beneﬁcial
to encourage an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation (e.g., focus on
whyyoumayormaynot implement a behavior and on its consequences
and ends in response to appetitive stimuli for patients with addictions).
CBT-based treatments involve techniques that may be consistent with
promoting either a shift towards a concrete level of goal/action
identiﬁcation (e.g., detailed Socratic questioning, situational analysis,
detailed activity scheduling, and breaking down tasks into steps) or
towards an abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation (e.g., downward
arrow technique, discussion of schemas and beliefs). Similarly, the
hypothesized development of attentional control skills in mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy may facilitate an individual's ability to ﬂexibly
shift level of processing in response to circumstances. Moreover, a
recent therapeutic approach — The Method of Levels — is theoretically
derived from control theory, and emphasizes the importance of
engendering the conditions in which patients can sustain their
awareness on their higher-level goals and begin to approach them
differently, so as to reorganize the relationships between goals (for a
fuller discussion of control theory and therapeutic change, see
Higginson et al., in press).
Fourth, the literature indicates that the predominant level of goal/
action identiﬁcation adopted is inﬂuenced by individual differences
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) but also by circumstances, mood, and
language use. The effect of language use on level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is clinically important because it indicates a point for
assessment and intervention. Stapel and Semin (2007) have shown
that the language used by one person inﬂuences the level of goal/
action identiﬁcation utilised by another person. Furthermore, the
language used by an individual can indicate his level of goal/action
identiﬁcation (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). Thus, the careful observation of
language can be a means to assess level of goal/action identiﬁcation,
whereas the systematic use of language within therapy can be a
means to inﬂuence level of goal/action identiﬁcation in patients. For
example, this analysis suggests the importance of using speciﬁc and
concrete language with patients with depression to facilitate their
shift away from abstract levels of goal/action identiﬁcation (Watkins,
2009b). Likewise, multiple studies have shown that questions asking
“Why?” prime the abstract level of goal/action identiﬁcation, whereas
questions asking “How?” prime a concrete level of goal/action
identiﬁcation, with accompanying functional effects (e.g., Watkins &
Baracaia, 2002; Watkins et al., 2008). Building on this idea, an
intervention designed to train depressed individuals to be more
concrete when faced with difﬁculties (i.e., explicitly training a more
ﬂexible use of level of goal/action identiﬁcation in response to
difﬁculties and correcting the blocked tendency to adopt an abstract
level of goal/action identiﬁcation bias) involved repeated practice at
asking “How?” and focusing on speciﬁc details, and reduced
depression, rumination, and anxiety relative to a no-training control
(Watkins & Moberly, 2009; Watkins et al., 2009). Similarly, psycho-
logical distance and visual perspective could be manipulated via
imagery exercises within treatment to train participants to regulate
their level of goal/action identiﬁcation (e.g., Williams & Moulds,
2008).
A key issue for the current hypothesis is explaining what causes
individuals with psychological disorders to adopt abnormal and
maladaptive levels of goal/action identiﬁcation. There are several,
potentially complementary, accounts. First, just as individuals can
implicitly learn over time a relationship between psychological
distance and level of goal/action identiﬁcation, they could also learn
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identiﬁcation, particularly when there is positive reinforcement for
adopting a level of goal/action identiﬁcation if it helps to adaptively
respond to circumstances. Moreover, given the ﬁndings about the
effect of language on construal, it is plausible that this learning is also
shaped in childhood through socialization processes, with primary
caregivers' language use encouraging adaptive shifts in construal.
However, for people at risk of developing psychological disorders,
these learning processes may be disrupted: an abusive, critical, or
neglectful early environment would lack beneﬁcial socialization
towards appropriate use of level of goal/action identiﬁcation, and in
such an environment, coping responses are less likely to produce
positive outcomes, making it harder to learn the functional connec-
tion between construal and context (e.g., Sarin & Nolen-Hoeksema,
2010; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2002 for evidence of early environments
associated with rumination). Furthermore, abnormal regulation of
level of goal/action identiﬁcation may be learnt because shifts in level
of goal/action identiﬁcation could be negatively reinforced by the
removal of distress rather than positively reinforced through goal
progress. The escape theory proposes that concrete identiﬁcation of
sensory experience distracts from negative self-evaluations, whilst a
number of theories propose that an abstract level of goal/action
identiﬁcation with respect to concrete reliving or recall of upsetting
memories may avoid intense affect (e.g., McIsaac & Eich, 2004 re
observer perspective; Martell et al., 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco &
Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins et al., 2007 re rumination; Williams
et al., 2007 re overgeneral memories). Consistent with this, the
observer perspective and rumination are associated with avoidance
(Cribb et al., 2006; Kenny & Bryant, 2007; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009;
Moulds, Kandris, Starr & Wong, 2007; Williams & Moulds, 2007).
Second, it may be that dysregulation of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation results from motivational factors. For example, the
belief that it is important to understand feelings and problems would
engender a tendency to adopt more abstract levels of goal/action
identiﬁcation (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; Watkins & Moulds, 2005b).
Third, it may be that effective regulation of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation depends upon the use of central executive resources
(Watkins, 2008), such that deﬁcits at effectively regulating level of
goal/action identiﬁcation in response to situational demands result
from deﬁcits in executive control. For example, reduced central
executive resources are implicated in increased impulsive appetitive
behaviors in addiction (e.g., Wiers et al., in press).
In conclusion, thispaperoutlinesevidence forhow level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is a potentially important dimension that inﬂuences a
range of clinically-relevant outcomes including emotion, cognition, and
behavior, which seems to be adaptively regulated in healthy controls.
Furthermore, there is evidence that this regulation of level of goal/action
identiﬁcation is abnormal in a number of psychological disorders,
indicating that this process is a possible transdiagnostic process.
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